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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to highlight factors contributing to the audit expectation gap 
in Nigeria. The audit expectation gap is the difference in perception between auditors and 
users of audited financial statements concerning the nature of auditing. Unfortunately, 
there have been criticisms of the auditor by the public from which opinions have emerged 
over the years due to business failure. It seems the users have a different idea of what 
auditing should be. This is what has led to the audit expectation gap. The factors 
contributing to this gap that are of particular concern to the researcher in this study are 
uncertainty about the responsibilities of external auditors, misunderstanding of audit 
report messages, uncertainty about the extent to which audit reports may be used in 
making investment decisions and independence of auditors. This study adopts a survey 
research design. Even though the study covers the business landscape of Nigeria, a 
sample size of four hundred (400) persons made up of one hundred (100) each of 
auditors, accountants in business, bankers and investors/stockbrokers was selected 
conveniently as time permitted from some accounting firms, banks, investment houses 
and companies in Lagos and Ogun States. The research instrument used was the 
questionnaire. The data collected was analyzed using one-way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) and Factor Analysis. It was discovered that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the opinion of auditors and audit beneficiaries in Nigeria with respect 
to the statutory role of external auditors, reliability on audit reports for investment 
decision making, nature and meaning of audit report messages scores and independence 
scores. Factor analysis revealed that the audit expectation gap in Nigeria is multi faceted 
but consists mainly of misunderstanding of the external auditor’s responsibilities by the 
users of audited financial statements. From the findings, we recommended that users 
should be educated on the responsibilities of auditors, the extent to which they can rely 
on auditor’s report and nature of audit services. Also, because auditors’ independence is 
crucial in maintaining public confidence in the profession, the number of years an auditor 
can provide audit services to a particular client be reduced and there should be limits on 
auditor’s provision of audit and non-audit services at the same time to a particular client. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction to this study. It consists of a background to the study, 
statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, research questions, research 
hypotheses, significance of the study, scope and limitations of the study, summary of 
research methodology, sources of data and definition of terms. For details, more 
information is provided in the sections below.  
1.1 Background to the Study 
The accounting profession in Nigeria has been under intense pressure due to rising public 
expectations which is as a result of series of financial failures that occurred during the 
recessionary years of the late 80’s and the early 90’s (Ekwueme, 2000:14). These 
financial failures happened too quickly after an ‘unqualified’ audit report was issued by 
the external auditors. Koh and Woo (1998:147) noted that in recent years, some 
spectacular and well-publicized corporate collapses and the subsequent implication of the 
reporting auditors have highlighted the audit expectation gap. In reality, the unqualified 
opinion is wrongly seen as a certification that the firm or enterprise is solvent, liquid and 
has the capacity to adapt to the dynamics of the environment. Any subsequent failure of 
business resulting from management misjudgment, fraudulent practice, economic 
instability, inconsistency in micro and macro economic policies etc are viewed as failures 
of auditors (Adeniji, 2004:510).  
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The role of external audit is crucial in today’s corporate world. This is especially due to 
the separation of ownership from management as a result of numerous shareholders in 
companies. The external auditors are usually perceived as independent and as a result 
users rely on audit reports because of they expect auditors are unbiased (Nagy, 2001:4). 
This role is carried out to add credibility to the financial information released after the 
end of a company’s financial year. The credibility is, however, called into question after 
some spectacular and well-publicized corporations (for example Enron and WorldCom in 
USA) collapsed shortly after an unqualified (in other words “clean”) audit report had 
been issued (Lee, Gloeck and Palaniappan, 2007:1).  
These events have thrown the accounting profession into a spotlight. Ekwueme (2000:14) 
explained that shareholders and most of the general public feel that as a result of the 
collapse of banks and firms, the auditor’s safeguard are worthless. These perceptions 
draw a line that needs to define the role of the auditor in protecting the interest of 
shareholders and ensuring that there is good corporate governance. Owners of business 
need auditors to more than ever before prevent and detect fraud. Perhaps, this is due to 
the expanding nature of modern day businesses. Clients need value added and not an 
auditor that will vouch and do the normal trade test (Nwokolo, 1998:25). Additionally, 
auditors have been known for high integrity and objectivity as well as their commitment 
to public interest. In relation to this view, Hillier (2000:64) stated that diverse clients now 
expect them to provide more services than just performing statutory audit and attesting to 
the credibility of financial statements. The society wants their franchise to include 
detection of fraud and exposure of all corrupt practices that are likely to vitiate the 
fortunes of corporate entities. The difference between the actual nature and objective of 
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an audit and that perceived by the users of audited financial statements has led to the 
concept of “audit expectation gap”.  
Early studies on ‘audit expectation gap” can be traced to Liggio (1974). The study by 
Liggio (1974) defined the audit expectation gap as the difference between the levels of 
expected performance as envisioned by both the user of a financial statement and the 
independent accountant. The Cohen Commission (1978) extended this definition by 
identifying the existence of a gap between what the public expects or needs and what the 
auditors can and should reasonably expect to accomplish (Lee, Gloeck and Palaniappan 
(2007:2). In the words of Evans (1978) “in general, users appear to have reasonable 
expectations of the abilities of auditors and the assurance they can give.” Similarly, 
Ekwueme (2000:14) asserted that the audit expectation gap lies between the role of an 
auditor as perceived by the auditor and the expectation of users of financial statements. 
This gap has emerged due to the changing nature of the business environment. Nagy 
(2001:6) pointed out Flint’s (1988:13) perception of an auditor. This perception was that 
the auditor is a servant of society with the role being expectations driven.  
The current study aims to complement the study of Lee, Gloeck and Palaniappan (2007), 
Schelluch and Gay (2006), Saha and Baruah (2008) in the following ways. First, the 
study examines the opinion of auditors, clients and users of audited financial statements 
on their understanding of the statutory role of external auditors in Nigeria. Secondly, this 
study confirms the components of the audit expectation gap in Nigeria. The components 
are divided into four factors. Two factors namely responsibility and reliability are 
adapted from the study of best, Buckby and Tan (2001). Nature and meaning of audit 
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report messages factor is adapted from Schelluch and Gay (2006). This study however 
moves the study by the above researchers by looking into the independence factor. For 
details, these factors are expounded upon in the literature review.   
This research work is divided into five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the 
remaining part of this study is organized into four chapters. In the second chapter, the 
prior studies carried out on the audit expectation gap will be reviewed. The chapter 
begins with an introduction, followed by the conceptual and theoretical framework of the 
research. The conceptual framework focuses on the research problem. The theoretical 
framework focuses on the theory behind the audit expectation gap. Other sub sections in 
the literature review are history of auditing, who the auditor is, reason for audit in 
Nigeria, the audit expectation gap, responsibilities of auditors, the emerging role of the 
21st century auditor to detect and prevent fraud, the role of an auditor in ascertaining the 
going concern status of a company, the case of Cadbury Plc and perceived auditor’s 
responsibility, reliability factor, nature and meaning of audit report messages, 
independence factor, approaches to reduce the audit expectation gap, understanding the 
role of other players in the capital market, the role of education and improving the 
independence of auditors. The third chapter discusses the research methodology. This 
chapter looks into the research design, population of study, sample size and techniques, 
data gathering method, actual field work/location of study and data analysis method. The 
fourth chapter presents the results from data analysis. Finally, in the fifth chapter the 
findings are highlighted, the study is summarized and a conclusion drawn. 
Recommendations are also made in this chapter to help the audit profession in Nigeria 
retain its significance amidst changing times.  
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1.2 Statement of Research Problem 
The crucial nature of auditing in ensuring the integrity and reliability of financial 
information cannot be overemphasized. It is for this reason that the canons of many 
countries require the attestation of financial statements by external auditors. 
Unfortunately, there are criticisms of the auditor from which opinions have emerged over 
the years as a result of companies that have failed. This criticism of auditors in Nigeria by 
users of audited financial statements has stirred many a response both from the profession 
and statutes. It seems the users have a different idea of what auditing should be. This is 
what has led to the audit expectation gap. The existence of this gap has been caused by 
many factors. The business environment is changing and this requires that the auditor’s 
responsibilities be increased to include fraud detection/prevention. Also, users want to be 
able to rely on audited financial statements for investment decision making. They also 
desire the absolute independence of the auditor because absence of it may reduce 
performance. Users also may have a different interpretation of the nature and meaning of 
audit report messages. These are some of the factors that contribute to the audit 
expectation gap.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of carrying out this study are: 
1. To identify the opinion of auditors and audit beneficiaries on the statutory role of 
external auditors in Nigeria.  
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2. To identify whether responsibility, reliability, nature and meaning of audit report 
messages and independence factors contribute to the audit expectation gap in 
Nigeria.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The questions this study is concerned with are: 
1. To what extent have external auditors and audit beneficiaries perceive the 
statutory role of auditors in Nigeria? 
2. To what extent do reliability scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria contribute to an audit expectation gap? 
3. To what extent do nature and meaning of audit report messages scores between 
auditors, bankers, investors and accountants in Nigeria contribute to an audit 
expectation gap? 
4. To what extent do independence scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria contribute to an audit expectation gap? 
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Ho: There is no difference between the opinion of auditors and audit beneficiaries on the 
statutory role of external auditors in Nigeria. 
H1: There is a difference between the opinion of auditors and audit beneficiaries on the 
statutory role of external auditors in Nigeria. 
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Hypothesis 2  
Ho: There is no difference in reliability scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria. 
H1: There is difference in reliability scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis 3 
Ho: There is no difference in nature and meaning of audit report messages scores between 
auditors, bankers, investors and accountants in Nigeria. 
H1: There is difference in nature and meaning of audit report messages scores between 
auditors, bankers, investors and accountants in Nigeria.  
Hypothesis 4 
Ho: There is no difference in independence scores between auditors, bankers, investors 
and accountants in Nigeria. 
H1: There is difference in independence scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria.  
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The motivation for carrying out this study in Nigeria is that auditors are blamed for 
business failure, perhaps as a result of misunderstanding of the nature of auditing. This 
study will be beneficial to the following: 
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1. External audit clients: who form part of the audit beneficiaries will benefit from 
the results of this study. They will have a better understanding of the statutory 
objectives of external audit in order to reduce any unreasonable expectations of 
the external auditor. 
2. Auditors: who help to maintain public confidence in financial statements will 
understand the expectation of the society in view of protecting their interests and 
remaining relevant.  
3. The Accounting Profession: may need to redefine the role of external auditors 
because of the changing nature of the business environment.  
4. Scholars in Auditing, Forensic Accounting and Related Areas: who push the 
frontiers of knowledge will benefit from this study by developing research 
interests from the findings of this study. Also, they will have a broader 
understanding of the audit expectation gap in the Nigerian context.  
1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The main focus of this study is to identify the existence of an audit expectation gap in 
Nigeria. The determinants of the audit expectation gap are numerous. This study adapts 
the factors looked into by Best, Buckby and Tan (2001) in their study of audit expectation 
gap in Singapore which are responsibility factor (the external auditor’s duties) and 
reliability factor. Schelluch and Gay (2006) found that the nature and meaning of audit 
report messages also contributes to an audit expectation gap. This factor will be looked 
9 
 
into in the Nigerian context. An additional factor called independence threat will be 
looked into.  
There is a wide range of users of the financial information of a company (Saha and 
Baruah, 2008:82). This study has been designed to cover the entire Nigerian investment 
climate. However, it has been limited to a sample size of four hundred (400) respondents 
who are located in Lagos state and Ogun state in Nigeria for proximity. The opinions of a 
hundred (100) accountants, auditors, shareholders, bankers will be solicited. However, 
the present study would have been broader if in the list of the various occupational 
groups, debenture holders, creditors, other long term providers of finance, auditing 
standard setters and government were included.  
In the course of this study there were limitations due to time factor. As a result the 
objectives of the study were minimized to ensure the ability of the researcher to cover 
them. The scope of the study was limited to only 400 prospective respondents. However, 
the researcher admits that a greater level of evidence may have been obtained using a 
larger number of respondents.  
1.8 Summary of Research Methodology 
This study is designed as a survey research which utilizes questionnaires to gather 
primary data. Secondary data would be obtained from journals, magazines, newspapers 
and internet sites. The retrieved data would be analyzed using one-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) to test the difference in means between the four groups of 
respondents. Factor analysis would then be used to identify the more prominent factors. 
The type of factor analysis carried out is confirmatory since hypothesis about factors in a 
10 
 
set of variables have been postulated. However, Factor Analysis is not carried out to test 
any hypothesis. The one-way Analysis of Variance and Factor Analysis will be done by 
means of computer software called Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
version 15.  
1.9 Sources of Data 
In this study, primary and secondary data will be obtained. The questionnaire is the 
source of primary data while data derived from similar research works undertaken by 
researchers in this subject area constitute secondary data. The secondary data will also be 
obtained from annual reports of selected companies in Nigeria’s petroleum sector and 
two companies in the breweries sector. 
1.10 Definition of Terms 
Audit: In this study ‘audit’ refers to statutory audit carried out by external auditors. It is 
an independent examination of the financial statements of a company. 
Expectation: This word refers to the purpose of audit as perceived by the users of 
financial statements. 
Gap: This is the inability of auditors to meet the expectation of the users. In this study, 
the gap is a result of misunderstanding of the auditor’s role and responsibilities, 
inadequate understanding of the message passed by the audit report and expectations 
about auditor’s independence.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
The following literature review entails an examination of the factors contributing to an 
audit expectation gap in Nigeria. Following this introductory section, a conceptual 
framework of the audit expectation gap is established. This is followed by a theoretical 
framework. This chapter reviews previous literature associated with the history of 
auditing, role of the auditor, reasons for audit in Nigeria, development of the expectation 
gap concept, factors contributing to the audit expectation gap in Nigeria and approaches 
for narrowing the gap. The factors that are reviewed in this study are responsibility, 
reliability, nature and meaning of audit report messages and independence of auditors.  
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
The external audit function in business environments is directly related to the need for 
accountability by management. Due to the diversity of users of financial statements, the 
auditor may be faced with many perceived roles. Audit means different things to different 
people and this exposes external auditors to more than one body of varying expectations 
(Hudaib and Haniffa, 2003:6). This is the reason for considering how auditors and users 
of audited financial statements perceive the responsibility of auditors, extent of reliability 
on audit reports, nature and meaning of audit report messages and independence of 
auditors. However, these expected roles are not fixed and this may cause a modification 
of the auditor’s role from time to time. This explanation has been attributed to the audit 
expectation gap. In addition, Humphrey, Moizer and Turley (1993:395) conceived that 
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recent financial scandals followed by the parliamentary questions about the auditing 
profession have increased the expectations debate incorporating fraud detection, auditor 
independence, public interest reporting and the meaning of audit reports. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework  
Based on the public interest theory (Posner, 1974), accountants are meant to serve the 
public interest. Deegan (2004:35) opined that a reason for regulation of financial 
accounting practice is that investors need protection from fraudulent organizations that 
may produce misleading information, which due to information asymmetries, cannot be 
known to be fraudulent when used. Regulation is supplied in response to the demand of 
the public for the correction of inefficient or inequitable market practices. Similarly, 
regulation is put in place to benefit society as a whole rather than particular vested 
interest, and the regulatory body is considered to represent the interests of the society in 
which it operates, rather than the private interests of the regulators (Deegan, 2004:60).  
In Nigeria the body that regulates the activities of professional auditors is the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN). This is the umbrella under which professional 
auditors practice. They ought to represent the interest of the society in which they operate 
especially as user confidence increases with the financial information approved by the 
auditor. However, users expectations of the auditor have been found by Saha and Baruah 
(2008) to vary when there is a misunderstanding of the nature of auditing. Consequently, 
because there are many users of accounting information, there may be varied 
expectations by them as well (Hudaib and Haniffa, 2003:6).  
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According to Adeniji (2004:510) the dictionary of accounting defines audit expectation 
gap as a gap between the role of an auditor as perceived by the auditor and the 
expectation of the users of financial statements. The users include investors, lender 
employees, supplies, other trade creditors, customers, banks, government, insurance 
company etc.  
2.3 History of Auditing  
Auditing is a process carried out by auditors to assure owners of a business that their 
resources are well managed by persons acting on their behalf. The origin of audit dates 
from ancient times when the landowners allowed tenant farmers to work on their land 
whilst the landowners themselves did not become involved in the business of farming. 
The landowners relied upon an overseer who ‘listened’ to the accounts of stewardship 
given by the tenants (Adeniji, 2004:1). Agents were responsible for keeping, managing 
and ensuring the safety of the property of others. Naturally, this gave rise to issues related 
to trust, integrity and competence (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, 2005:8).  
In addition, Lee and Ali (2008:2) explained that the ancient checking activities found in 
Greece (around 350 B.C.) appear to be closest to present day auditing. In the history of 
developed countries like England, audit of public accounts like Exchequer and Borough 
accounts took place in medieval times. Also, Gul et al (1994) revealed that during the 
reign of Henry 1 (1100-1135) special audit officers were appointed for state revenue and 
expenditure. Similarly, merchants of Florence, Genoa and Venice employed auditors to 
verify riches bought by captains of sailing ships which were returning from the old world 
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to the European continent (Lee and Ali, 2008:2). Incidentally, Brown (1962) asserted that 
in these places, the purpose of audit was to detect fraud (Lee and Ali, 2008:2).  
The role of auditors before 1840 was limited to performing detailed verification of each 
transaction through audit procedures that excluded sampling techniques. However, the 
Industrial Revolution brought about business expansion. There was a no regulation of the 
securities market and the likelihood that businesses would fail was high. Also, the 
advancement of the securities market and credit granting institutions facilitated the 
development of the capital market and led to the growth of companies. This reflected in 
separation of ownership from management (Lee and Ali, 2008:3). At this point, auditing 
was sought as a way to protect the shareholders/investors. Audit procedures were carried 
out by introducing sampling techniques and the effectiveness of internal control measures 
were tested.  
The primary purpose of an audit between the 1920s and 1960s became adding credibility 
to the financial statements rather than detecting fraud and errors. (Lee and Ali, 2008:2-3). 
The users need a level of assurance that the financial information furnished is reliable, 
accurate, fairly presented and objective. Consequently, they require that financial 
statements be reviewed by an independent examiner who is called an auditor (Adeleke, 
1996:8, Edun, 1999:41). Also, it has been argued that audit is needed because the 
financial statement prepared by the management may not actually represent the financial 
position of the company (Adeniji, 2004:4). Significantly, auditors began offering 
advisory services between 1960s and 1990s as a secondary objective (lee and Ali, 
2008:4).  
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Auditing in Nigeria spans over fifty five (55) years. In 1951 an audit firm Cooper 
Brothers & Co (now Coopers & Lybrand) did feasibility studies for a jute and cotton mill 
at Onitsha. Similarly, in 1952 ENC (NEPA) approached Cooper Brothers for help in 
preparation of their first annual accounts. However, the first indigenous firm of Akintola 
Williams & Co came on the scene in May 1952. During these early years, audit 
procedures were made up of detailed review of records designed to determine whether 
cash transactions were recorded in the appropriate accounts and for the correct amount. 
This is different from the present day audit which is carried out by reviewing the system 
and testing audit evidence so that an opinion can be expressed. The attest function of 
auditors also ensures that there is increased reliance which can be placed on audit reports 
(Edun, 1999:41).  
2.4 Who is an Auditor? 
The term “audit” as defined by Woolf (1997:1) is  
a process (carried out by suitably qualified auditors) 
whereby the accounts of business entities, including limited 
companies, charities, trusts and professional firms, are 
subjected to scrutiny in such detail as will enable the 
auditors to form an opinion as to their truth and fairness. 
This opinion is then embodied in an ‘audit report’, 
addressed to those parties who commissioned the audit, or 
to whom the auditors are responsible under statute. 
Similarly, Adeniji (2004:1) described audit as “the independent examination of, and 
expression of opinion on, the financial statements of an enterprise by an appointed 
auditor in pursuance of that appointment and in compliance with any relevant statutory 
obligation”. The opinion formed by an auditor in relation to the truth and fairness of the 
financial statement is embodied in what is called audit report. This report by the auditor is 
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addressed to the company’s stakeholders who have devoted their material, financial and 
other resources to the care of the managers. Even though there are many types of audit, 
this study is concerned with financial audit. Financial audit is an ex post verification 
process having to do with a policing role which requires the independence of the auditor 
(Power, 1996:4). 
A person who is a professionally qualified accountant who has been given a license to 
carry out public practice is an auditor. An auditor is an independent person appointed by 
the owners of a company to examine the financial statements prepared by management 
(Izedonmi, 2000:1). Even though the primary duty of an auditor is to express a 
professional opinion on the financial statements, other services that an auditor can 
provide are accountancy, taxation, liquidation and receivership, investigation, 
management advisory services, financial advice and secretarial services. However, the 
fees for these other services do not form part of the audit fee.  
The auditor is supposed to have integrity, be independent and objective, conform to 
confidentiality principles, maintain technical competence and conform to technical 
standard (Adeniji, 2004:6). Auditing is regulated by statutes (Company and Allied 
Matters Act, 1990 as amended), professional regulations in form of accounting standards 
and auditing standards issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) 
and in some cases adapted from those of some more developed countries. The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (2005:8) noted that the mid nineteenth 
century company audits were carried out by persons (principals or otherwise) whose 
independence from the managers of the company was no issue. However, due to 
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information asymmetries and general lack of trust as depicted by the agency theory, 
principals began to appoint expert auditors and rely upon their work.  
Information asymmetry as described by Scott (2003:7-8) is a situation whereby some 
parties to a business transaction may have an information advantage over others. In 
addition, there are two types of information asymmetry which are adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when management and other insiders know more 
about the current condition and future prospects of the firm than outside investors. 
Secondly, moral hazard occurs because of the separation of ownership from management 
in large companies. In this study, our concern is adverse selection whereby investors have 
a dearth of information than company insiders. Auditing is therefore a tool to control 
adverse selection by reporting on the inside information to outsiders.  
2.5 Reason for Audit in Nigeria 
The need for external audit in Nigeria and many parts of the world can be attributed to 
many factors. Principally, information asymmetry is the main reason behind audit. It is 
associated with agency relationships where a person acts on behalf of another person. In 
an agency relationship, the principal delegates responsibility to the agent. In medium and 
large companies, the agents are the management team who are not necessarily owners of 
the business while the principals are the actual owners who contribute their financial 
resources to daily affairs of the company.  
According to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (2005:8) 
agents were given responsibility for the safekeeping or management of the property of 
others. In order to ensure that agents act in the interest of the principals, another set of 
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independent agents called auditors are appointed. These persons safeguard the interest of 
the owners and provide credibility on the financial accounts prepared by the management 
(Adeniji, 2004:4-5). Conversely, Power (1996:6) argued that audits do not contribute 
automatically to organizational transparency even though that is the general consensus of 
audit in organizations. Ogidan (1999:30) explained that audit is carried out to render an 
opinion about whether the reporting function actually implemented by the management is 
acceptable or not in terms of some generally accepted criteria either derived from law or 
precepts of the profession aimed at self-regulation.  
According to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (2005:4) 
agency theory is a useful economic theory of accountability, which helps to explain the 
development of the audit. However, the motives of agents may not be in the best interest 
of the principals. As a result, principals use audit to reinforce trust. The kind of audit 
referred to here is external audit. The canon of different countries of the world requires 
that external audit is carried out by professional auditors. For public limited liability 
companies, external audit is required by the Company and Allied Matters Act (1990) as 
amended. In Nigeria, to practice as an auditor one must be a chartered accountant as well 
as a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN). Also, 
experience must have been acquired by such a person working with an audit firm for not 
less than 30 months and a practicing license must be obtained from ICAN (Izedonmi, 
2000:79).  
2.6 The Audit Expectation Gap  
21 
 
The criticism of auditors by society reflects in the litigious environment which 
characterizes auditing today and can be traced to the audit expectation-performance gap 
(Boyd et al 2001:56). The failure of business corporations and the subsequent financial 
loss borne by the shareholders of the same has resulted in these criticisms. In the ’80s, the 
profession defined the concept of the “audit expectation gap” and focused public 
criticism on that concept. This gap exists between the expectations of the capital market 
investors who don’t doubt the financial reports audited by accountants, and the nature of 
the auditor’s task, which is concomitant with the responsibility delegated to them by set 
auditing standards and the law (Eden, Ovadia and Zuckerman (2003:32).  
In more developed countries like the United States, auditors have had to battle with legal 
suits taken against them (Ali, Yusof, Mohamad and Lee, 2007:3). It is assumed that the 
public in general and stakeholders of companies have a belief about the auditor’s 
performance. This is premised on the expectation that auditors will be able to safeguard 
their financial interest. In contrast, this expectation is hardly resolved and the audit 
expectation gap emanates from these unresolved expectations which influence the 
confidence of financial statement users negatively (Saha and Baruah, 2008:1). In this 
light, the expectations gap has been defined by Ojo (2006:2) as the difference between 
what users of financial statements, the general public perceive an audit to be and what the 
audit profession claim is expected of them in conducting an audit.  
This gap is related to issues such as responsibilities, independence, third party liability of 
the auditor, reliance on the audit report by users, meaning of the audit report as perceived 
by users. Lin and Chen (2004:93) identified the audit expectation gap to be a crucial issue 
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associated with the independent auditing function and have significant implications on 
the development of accounting standards and practices. A major cause of this gap is that 
users have high expectations of the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud (Best, 
Buckby and Tan, 2001:2). Consequently, when a company faces problems as a result of 
undiscovered illegal acts either perpetrated by management, other insiders or third 
parties, the external auditor is blamed.  
Other reasons for this gap are inadequate audit standards, deficient performance of 
auditors, unreasonable expectations of users of audited financial statements, perception 
that the audit profession can be trusted to serve public interest, inadequate education of 
the public about auditing, structure and regulation of the profession and misinterpretation 
of the audit report. The findings of Humphrey et al (1993), Albrecht (2003), Lee, Gloeck 
and Palaniappan (2007), Best et al (2001), Lin and Chen (2004), Saha and Baruah (2008), 
Ekwueme (2000), Lee and Ali (2008), Siddiqui and Nasreen (2004), Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2007) and Ojo (2006) have supported this view.   
The business environment is dynamic and this influences the expectation of users as well. 
In response, the profession addresses this gap by issuing new audit guidelines and 
standards. In relation to this, Saha and Baruah (2008:1) explained that there is always a 
time gap between the changing expectations of the users and the response by the 
profession and the result is the audit expectations gap even though the time gap was not 
accounted for in their study. In a previous study, Humphrey et al (1993:396) cited Tricker 
(1982) who found that the audit expectations gap is a natural time lag in the auditing 
profession identifying and responding to changing and expanding public expectations.  
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Mostly, an audit expectation gap has been found in the area of fraud detection/prevention 
by auditors, maintenance of accounting records, the freedom of the entity from fraud and 
the exercising of auditor judgment in the selection of audit procedures (Best et al, 
2001:2). Manson and Zaman (2000:15) identified that a prime source of the expectations 
gap is user’s lack of knowledge about the auditor’s duties to detect fraud and error. There 
is a difference in beliefs between auditors, users and preparers of prospective financial 
information, concerning forecast reliability and the role and responsibilities of auditors 
and management (Schelluch and Gay, 2006:653). Similarly, Kirk (2006:205) expressed 
fears that if major groups of financial reporting participants differ in their perceptions of 
different standards like ‘true and fair view’ a financial reporting expectation gap may 
occur. 
Previously, Siddiqui and Nasreen (2004) examined whether an audit expectations gap 
exists between university students of accounting and accounting professionals. They 
argued that the existence of such a gap between university students of accounting and 
professionals points to even a wider one between auditors and the public in Bangladesh. 
Basically, this gap has been described to be a result of the shift in the objectives of 
statutory audit over the years from mere detection of fraud and technical errors to 
determining whether financial statements give a fair picture of the financial position of a 
company (Ekwueme, 2000:14).  
Given the numerous issues contributing to the audit expectation gap, this study is 
concerned with four factors which are responsibility of auditors, reliability, nature and 
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meaning of audit report messages and independence factor. They will be expounded upon 
in the following subsections. 
2.6.1 Responsibilities of Auditors 
If echoes from the Failed Banks Tribunal set up by the Federal Government are anything 
to go by, those agitating for the crucifixion of auditors consequent upon the failed banks 
saga should have a re-think over their stand (Archibong, 1996:14). This is because the 
inadequacy of auditors was not confirmed at the Failed Banks Tribunals (Asein, 
1999:12). Like any other profession, there are rules and regulations guiding auditors. The 
Company and Allied Matters Act (1990) as amended specifies in Section 360(1) that  
It shall be the duty of the company’s auditor’s, in preparing 
their report to carry out such investigations as may enable 
them to form an opinion as to the following matters 
whether-  
(a) proper accounting records have been kept by the 
company and proper returns adequate for their audit have 
been received from branches not visited by them; 
(b) the company’s balance sheet and (if not 
consolidated) its profit and loss account are in agreement 
with the accounting records and returns. 
This reveals that the primary duty of the auditor is not to detect fraud and other 
irregularities but this is what existing shareholders and potential investors expect from 
them (Archibong, 1996:15). This conflict between the statutory role and the expectation 
of the present and potential users of financial statement is what has led to the audit 
expectation gap. Asein (1999:12) affirmed that the lack of understanding of the statutory 
roles of the auditor in corporate governance (often referred to as the expectation gap) is 
the reason why persons call for the arrest and prosecution of auditors. In addition, Lee 
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and Ali (2008:5) sounded that the public’s perception of the present role of auditors 
remains at the ‘traditional conformance’ stage because of the public’s refusal to recognize 
the shift in the auditing paradigm.  
In 1896, Lord Lopes stated that the auditor is not a bloodhound but a watchdog. This 
judgment was given as a result of an event where an auditor relied upon managers’ 
certificates without the auditor conducting a physical observation of the inventory or 
taking steps to confirm valuation. Subsequently, Vaughan Williams J found that auditors 
and directors were liable for dividends paid from non-existent profits. Any damages 
sought against them in respect of subsequent insolvency on the basis of tort were denied. 
This judgment raised concern by the audit profession and the validity of managers’ 
certificates was also questioned. In the Appeal Court, Lopes LJ stated that ‘an auditor is 
not bound to be a detective or as was said to approach his work with suspicion or with a 
foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is justified in believing tried 
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the company. This has been 
the source of the fraud detection and prevention debate in auditing (Ojo, 2006:6).  
However, Lord Lopes asserted that it is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the 
work ha has to perform that skill, care and caution which a reasonable competent, careful 
and cautious auditor would use. The definition of reasonable care however rests on the 
particular circumstances of each case (Ojo, 2006:6). Fraud detection moved from being a 
primary to a secondary objective for audit during this period. Abroad, fraud detection 
became an issue subsequent to the criticisms as a result of the collapse of Johnson 
Matthey Bankers in 1984, triggering the establishment of a working party of the Institute 
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of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales to consider matters relating to auditors’ 
responsibilities in relation to fraud. In addition, the government wanted to impose a duty 
to report fraud to the Bank of England upon auditors without the knowledge of the client 
organization. The ICAEW argued that this was an imposition of statutory duty and 
suggested that instead, companies should be required to maintain an adequate system of 
internal control (Ojo, 2006:6).  
In recent times, regulators have come to accept the need for professional audit since 
auditors provide investors with an assurance that the information in the financial 
statements is not materially inaccurate, and follows established accounting conventions 
(Ogidan, 1999:30). The aim of which is to ensure that the financial statements show a 
true and fair view of the state of affairs of a company. Though some persons have argued 
that audit is not crucial in the present day corporate market, Ng (1978) pointed that if 
managers are penalized when they use non-GAAP reporting methods, with effective audit 
technology the probability that a manager would select non-GAAP reporting methods 
would decrease as compared to a situation in which no audit were to take place (Ogidan, 
1999:31). More so Archibong (1996:16) argued that auditors have prevented countless 
disasters but these were done in secret. 
Interestingly, it has been argued by law and the accounting profession that management 
cannot be prevented from acting in their self-interest. But to ensure the credibility of 
financial reports there is need for external verification (Adams and Evans, 2004:98). In 
other words, external verification is a rationale for regulating accounting information. 
Self-interest is a characteristic of information asymmetry where insiders of a company 
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may have more information than outsiders. By way of protecting the stakeholders in 
companies from unscrupulous activities of insiders and third parties, statutory audit is a 
mechanism through which the financial records are matched with the prevailing financial 
position of a company. In the words of Bricker and Chandar (1998:486) accounting is 
concerned with information flows and their organization, which are central to business 
operations, managerial decision-making, and the nature and efficiency of capital markets. 
In this light, the very nature of accounting deals with ensuring the integrity of 
information produced in companies because the auditor is an independent agent.  
The combinations and merger movement of the late nineteenth century resulted in the 
formation of several publicly held corporations (Bricker and Chandar, 1998:492). 
However, Hawkins (1963) noted that before that time financial information was 
inadequate, investors bought their securities primarily on the basis of confidence and trust 
in the investment firms marketing the securities. This period was the childhood of the 
accounting profession and auditing practices were still considered unusual. The function 
of public accountants and their reports was grossly misunderstood (Bricker and Chandar, 
1998:492).  
Presently, times have changed for the auditing profession as there is increased demand 
for auditors to detect and prevent fraud and errors in companies due to the corporate 
failures that have taken place especially in the financial sector worldwide (Asein, 
1999:12). Some of these failures have been traced to fraud perpetrated by employees and 
management that were not escalated by the external auditor. Bologna and Lindquist 
(1995:9) argued that fraud has many definitions. It could be in form of a crime, tort, 
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corporate or management fraud. However, fraud can simply be described as dishonesty 
and willful misrepresentation of a material fact.  
It was to reduce the misunderstanding of users that the Auditing Practices Board (APB) 
recommended that the audit report should contain some text outlining the auditors’ duties 
in respect of fraud and error. Irregularities in form of material misstatements in financial 
reports are of particular interest to auditors because of their legal duty to report them 
(Krambia-Kapardis, 2002:266). Misstatement in form of misapplication of accounting 
principles was identified in the case of Enron (an energy company that failed in 2002) 
after taking advantage of the United States accounting rules which enable companies to 
set up Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to manage assets off balance sheet and in essence 
spread the business risk. Aguolu (2003:34) observed that no single event brought about 
the fall of both Enron and Arthur Andersen (the auditors) but many events happened so 
close together, one leading to the other, hence resulting in the exit of the two 
organizations. Even though the rules for creating SPEs were different from the normal 
principle of consolidation, Enron’s auditors Arthur Andersen approved of the 
transactions. When the company was made to restate its financial statements using the 
normal accounting principles, they ran into heavy loss. These events and many others that 
were revealed in the course of time led to the gradual loss of confidence in Enron’s 
stakeholders (Deakin and Konzelmann, 2004:136). 
2.6.2 The Emerging Role of the 21st Century Auditor to Detect 
and Prevent Fraud 
The role of audit in this era is to refocus on public interest, redefine the audit relationship, 
ensure the integrity of financial reports, separate non-audit functions and other advisory 
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services. Also, audit methods need to be focused on risk attention, fraud awareness, 
objectivity and independence, increased attention to the needs of financial statement users 
(Lee and Ali, 2008:23). Since the primary purpose of external audit is not to detect fraud, 
investigating fraud requires the combined skills of a well-trained auditor and a criminal 
investigator. Fraud auditing is a relatively new discipline that emerged from the criminal 
and regulatory statutes involving business, financial crimes ranging from embezzlement, 
investment fraud, giving and accepting bribe and computer fraud to mention a few. 
Auditing for fraud and statutory audit are parallel in nature. The former is a means of 
identifying irregularities in accounting practices, procedures and controls. However, the 
latter is a means by which auditors uncover material deviations and variances from 
standards of acceptable accounting and auditing practice. Auditing for fraud involves 
looking beyond the transaction figures even though a statutory auditor is likely to become 
suspicious of an attempt made to disguise or cover up a transaction (Bologna and 
Lindquist, 1995:27-33).  
There may be some cases where the auditor’s work will lead to the detection of fraud. In 
such a situation the auditor is responsible for considering the potential effect on the 
financial information. In addition, the auditor should perform more procedures bearing in 
mind the type of fraud, other irregularities or errors, risk of their occurrences and 
likelihood that a particular type of fraud or error could have a material effect on the 
financial statements (Adeleke, 1996:10). In an attempt to ensure that auditors are better 
acquainted with this responsibility for fraud detection and prevention, the International 
Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240 was written.  
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The standard differentiated fraud from error and explained that there are two types of 
fraud relevant to the auditor which are misstatements from misappropriation of assets and 
misstatements from fraudulent financial reporting. It requires that the auditor perform 
procedures to obtain information that is used to identify the risks of material 
misstatement due to fraud and evaluate the design of the entity’s related controls and 
determine whether they have been implemented. Fraud was by the standard as an 
intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those charged with 
governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an 
unjust or illegal advantage. The standard acknowledges that fraud is a broad legal term 
therefore the auditor is concerned with fraud that causes material misstatement in the 
financial statements. Fraudulent financial reporting is characterized by intentional 
misstatements like omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements to deceive 
users, manipulation/falsification, alteration of accounting records, misrepresentation of 
financial statement events/transactions or significant information, intentional 
misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts, classification, manner of 
disclosure (International Standards on Auditing 240).  
Those responsible for the prevention and detection of fraud are the persons charged with 
the governance of the entity and management. Though an auditor is only an independent 
agent whose responsibility is to give an opinion of the true and fair view of the financial 
statements and not primarily to detect and prevent fraud and errors, in carrying out an 
audit engagement is to apply professional skepticism. Professional skepticism is an 
attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence. 
Essentially, the auditor should make inquiries of those charged with governance to 
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determine whether they have knowledge of any actual, suspected or alleged fraud 
affecting the entity (ISA 240, paragraph 23).   
The standard specified that after an audit is conducted and fraud involving management 
is found or where the fraud results in a material misstatement in the financial statements, 
the auditor should communicate these matters to those charged with governance as soon 
as practicable. Due to the level of sensitivity of fraud involving management or those 
charged with governance, seeking legal counsel may be necessary in guiding the auditor 
to take appropriate action (paragraph 96). This standard should go a long way to make 
auditors detect fraud and error in a company’s financial statement. Yet Obaidat (2007:4) 
found that due to low fraud cases in Jordan, auditors did not consider ISA 240 which 
showed a low degree of compliance of 73.9% in their study.  
Perhaps, some auditors are careful to chose an audit scope that will exonerate them from 
liability should it arise. The choice of a large audit scope depends on the number of 
auditors a firm can afford to employ given other intervening variables. Li, Song and 
Wong (2007) have found that there is a relationship between audit firm size and 
perception of audit quality. Audit conducted by large audit firms often ensure the 
disclosure of more items in the annual reports than audits conducted by smaller firms.    
2.6.3 The Role of an Auditor in Ascertaining the Going 
Concern Status of a Company  
The bane of criticism by the public when a company fails usually stems from the fact that 
an unqualified audit report was issued by external auditors shortly before the failure 
occurred. It is no surprise that corporate failure is synonymous to audit failure (Asein, 
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1999:12). Until recently, it was often taken for granted that the accounts of a company 
could be prepared on a going concern basis unless there were obvious indications to the 
contrary (Adeniji, 2004:275). Auditors are required to carry out procedures to provide 
them with assurance that the going concern basis used in the preparation of the financial 
statements is appropriate and there are adequate disclosures regarding that basis in the 
financial statements in order that they give a true and fair view (Adeniji, 2004:276). 
Users however perceive that a clean audit report is a going concern (Manson and Zaman, 
2000:18). In their study, the ability of a company to remain a going concern is linked 
with the value of their investment. On the part of auditors, it seems to avoid litigation, 
they are careful to explicitly disclose the going concern position of a company.  
2.6.4 The Case of Cadbury Plc, Enron and Perceived Auditor’s 
Responsibility 
In despair, Eden, Ovadia and Zuckerman (2003:2) noted that the criticism faced by the 
audit profession was never as poor as it is today because all efforts by the profession in 
the last two decades to improve its image have failed. The case of Enron has been quite 
significant to the audit profession because a year after the Sarbanes Oxley Act was 
enacted. The Act focuses on independence of auditors which will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. Enron’s accounting has been described by Deakin and Konzelmann 
(2004:136) as intelligent gambling. Rather than consolidate the accounts of the parent 
and subsidiary, assets were shifted between the parent company and its subsidiary leading 
to a misleading presentation of the accounts of Enron. Though the auditors had initially 
approved these deals, as soon as these deals began to unfold they told the company that 
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they were not compatible with accounting principles. Enron’s auditors subsequently went 
out of business.  
In Nigeria, the Cadbury scandal threw a limelight on the audit profession. The 
Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) found that =N=13.255 billion was the 
accumulated overstatement for the years 2002 to September 2006 when Akintola 
Williams Deloitte (AWD) audited the published accounts for those years and carried out 
an interim audit for the period ended September 30, 2006. Though the auditors were 
made to pay a fine of twenty (20) million naira within twenty one (21) days for failure to 
handle the accounts of the company with high level of professional diligence, no other 
sanction was placed on them (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:22). The 
outcome of these events in Nigeria and the United States are different. Abroad, auditors 
could be charged to court while in Nigeria, they settle out of court. Perhaps, settling out 
of court may encourage auditors to perform below the standard. Arthur Andersen LLP 
was charged with destruction of Enron-related documents and other questionable 
practices that further questioned the ethical integrity of the accounting profession 
(Reckers, Jennings, Lowe and Pany, 2007:629).   
Nigeria’s business environment is characterized by some ills. They are instability in 
power supply, increasing cost of production, political interference in business, rapid 
advancement in information technology and many more. However, business failure may 
be attributed to the inability of the company’s management to adequately envisage the 
influence of some or all of the above. From the public perspective, auditing is seen as a 
whistle blowing device. However, auditors cannot accept this responsibility unless there 
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is a shift in legal reforms. Also, because the survival of auditors depends on how well 
they satisfy the society’s needs, legal reform cannot be overemphasized (Asein, 1999:15).  
2.6.5 Reliability Factor 
The main purpose of audited financial statements is to ensure that information provided 
to investors is accurate (Colley, Doyle, Logan and Stettinius, 2003:233). Also, the 
opinion given by an auditor is expected to be constant throughout (Adeniji, 2004:510). 
However, this may not hold given some circumstances surrounding the issuance of an 
audit opinion. These communication assumptions may make the user more expectant than 
is needed. Some of these assumptions are an unqualified audit opinion is a clean bill of 
health, auditors guarantee the continuing existence of firms, auditors issue financial 
statements after the audit exercise and all fraud should be discovered by statutory audit 
(Adeniji, 2004:511).  
Financial statements are used by a variety of persons for different purposes which are 
share valuation and acquisition, divestment, mergers, dividend policy, diversification of 
portfolios, assessment of the worth of the firm, credit worthiness, etc. However, there is 
need for detailed analysis of any data provided in financial statements before they are 
relied upon. Audit is carried out to examine the financial books of a company and 
establish that they conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
present a true and fair view of the company’s financial position, ensure that the financial 
statements are free from material misstatements and conform to statutory regulations. 
This infers that the audit report is not a financial analysis upon which investment 
decisions should be predicated (Asein, 1999:13).  
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The audit report is the means through which auditors express their opinion on the truth 
and fairness of a company’s financial statements for the benefit principally of the 
shareholders, but also for other users (Adeniji, 2004:464). It is issued at the end of the 
audit assignment upon the financial statements prepared by the management of a 
company (Izedonmi, 2000:149). An expectation gap emerges therefore when the audit 
report is used for purposes not intended by statutes and the inability of the report to meet 
these needs (Asein, 1999:13). Therefore, reliance by users on the audit opinion in 
detecting and preventing all fraud may be out of place. It appears there is some level of 
uncertainty about the ability of positive and negative assurance reports to convey the 
desired level of assurance to users (Schelluch and Gay, 2005:658). Nevertheless, external 
auditors cannot rate the extent to which a shareholder or prospective investor can rely on 
a financial statement through an audit opinion. This questions the ability of users to 
understand the extent to which they can rely on the auditor’s report.  
The auditor employs sampling techniques in conducting an audit. This leaves out some 
transactions as a complete test may not be carried out. If reliance is to be placed on an 
auditor’s unqualified opinion, the scope of the auditor’s work may need to be defined. 
Where the scope of an auditor’s work is considerably large, findings emanating from that 
job may be easily relied upon than when the scope is relatively small. Also, the extent of 
reliance by the user depends on the type of audit opinion given. An audit opinion may be 
unqualified or qualified. Qualified audit opinions vary from “except for”, “subject to”, 
disclaimer of opinion and adverse opinion (Izedonmi, 2000:153-4).  
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Audit reports have a standard format which an auditor must apply at all times. However, 
unqualified audit opinions may not appear to give a great deal of information and this 
reduces the ability of some users to decode its meaning unless one has a substantial 
knowledge of accounting and auditing matters. The question however is how to make an 
audit report meaningful to users. Church, Davis and McCracken (2008:69) have argued 
that the form and wording of the report are such that users can easily distinguish a 
standard unqualified opinion from a nonstandard opinion. However, the auditor’s report 
has been criticized largely because it can be viewed as a pass/fail report even though the 
message it conveys is beyond pass and fail.  
In 1993 the Auditing Practices Board issued an expanded audit report titled Statement of 
Auditing Standard (SAS) 600 Auditors’ Reports on Financial Statement to educate users 
and reduce their misunderstandings in respect of certain matters pertaining to the audit 
function (Manson and Zaman, 2000:1). To promote the understanding of users, the 
Auditing Practices Board (APB) recommended that the forms of qualification described 
in the standard should be used unless, in the auditors’ opinion, to do so would fail to 
convey clearly the intended meaning. SAS 600 gives the circumstances in which each 
sort of qualification would be appropriate. It also emphasizes that the reader of an 
unqualified audit report should be left with no doubt as to the meaning and its 
implications (Adeniji, 2004:474).  
It has been advocated that if the views of user are adjusted to align with those of the 
profession there will be a reduction in the audit expectation gap. Manson and Zaman 
(2000:10) in their study determined the extent to which auditors, preparers and users 
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appear to be satisfied that the expanded audit report successfully communicates certain 
key issues. They found that auditors discuss findings from the audit process to the senior 
managers and directors mainly through the management letter. The content of this letter 
encapsulates deficiencies in a company’s internal control system and other advice that 
may give the company commercial advantage.  
Nevertheless, shareholders and prospective investors do not see these letters and so they 
have to rely on the audit report. However, a standard audit report does not include issues 
discussed with management and the directors. Omitting these issues from the audit report 
may reduce its usefulness and present the report as mere formality thereby increasing the 
problem of adverse selection information asymmetry. In addition, the extent of assurance 
is not clearly stated in the present audit reports issued in Nigeria. Assurance is influenced 
by the materiality concept of transactions in the financial statements and estimation 
issues. Perhaps, if the extent of assurance is included in the report users will better 
understand the extent to which reliance may be placed on the audit report.  
2.6.6 Nature and Meaning of Audit Report Messages 
The audit report is the text containing the message about the validity of financial 
statements examined by an auditor (Hronsky, 1998:19). In the public and private sectors 
of every nation, true and fair financial information is to be communicated through the 
preparation of periodic (e.g. annual) financial statements because managers of 
organizational resources are usually different from owners of such resources. Conversely, 
in recent times, the financial statements of organizations in the private sector have come 
under severe criticism of users and analysts of accounting information (Adeyemi and 
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Ogundele, 2003:22). This is mainly due to the reliance by users on the meaning of 
financial statements of companies subsequent to financial crisis experienced by them.   
Differences attributed to audit report message(s) by auditors and users are thought of as a 
lack of shared meaning and thus a communication problem (Hronsky, 1998:3). Based on 
the communication theory adopted by Hronsky (1998), the largest gap was said to exist 
between sophisticated groups (auditors, managers, accountants, bankers, financial 
analysts) and general public users (private shareholders and students). This difference 
was largely explained by differential knowledge levels and may be reduced by applying 
education. Boyle and Canning (2005:15) viewed education as a way to remove a certain 
level of professional mystique surrounding auditing by providing students with the 
necessary skills to scrutinize and evaluate the audit process.  
The communication process of auditors can be explained in the following analogy. The 
information source is the management of an organization, the message comprises of the 
financial statements, the transmitter is the audit report issued by the auditors, the receiver 
and information destination are the shareholders or investment managers that act as 
agents of the stakeholders (Adeyemi and Ogundele, 2003:23). The auditor decides on the 
message the report will convey to the reader. Subsequently, the reader receives the report. 
Then the user interprets the message, resulting in some kind of judgment about the 
validity of the financial statements. Such a judgment may or may not result in a 
subsequent behavioral response i.e., a decision or action (Hronsky, 1998:6). However, 
financial managers/executives and auditors are both parties to determining the final 
content of the financial statements and hence the audit report. Since there is no 
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parallelism in the communication between auditors and management, managers then have 
the ability to influence the formation of the audit opinion (Hronsky, 1998:18).  
The audit report is a statutory requirement for publicly quoted companies in Nigeria. 
Perceived and actual meaning of audit report messages may vary for different categories 
of users. This is because the knowledge of audit report messages is limited to persons 
with knowledge of auditing and related fields. Consequently, more sophisticated users 
may have a better understanding of the audit report than less sophisticated ones. To 
prevent information asymmetry, a less sophisticated investor/shareholder may need to 
employ the services of a financial analyst. This is because of the inherent inability to 
understand the message passed by the auditor which is not in details.  
There are different ways an auditor expresses an audit opinion. An unqualified audit 
opinion is one given by an auditor stating that the financial statements show a true and 
fair view of the state of affairs of a company. On the other hand, when an auditor is 
unhappy about the matters to report upon, a qualified report is issued. This implies there 
is a reservation that the accounts do not show a true and fair view or comply with the 
Company and Allied Matters Act as amended or relevant accounting standards 
(Izedonmi, 2000:151). Hronsky (1998:19) emphasized that significant differences in 
meaning are more likely to arise in respect of clean opinions. Because they are by far the 
most common type of opinion, attached to a wide variety of companies in differing 
industries at different positions along the continuum of corporate financial health, they 
send a signal more ambiguous and subject to varied interpretation than qualified 
opinions.  
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2.6.7 Independence Factor 
Recent corporate scandals and presumed audit failures have brought auditor 
independence, and consequently, audit quality, into the forefront (Brandon, 2003:2). 
Auditors are expected to be independent of management. However, in reality auditors 
may not be so objective when they carry out non-audit services and engage in audit for a 
long period of time in a company. Izedonmi (2000:83) described independence as a state 
of the mind which reflects in the objectivity and integrity of the auditor. Precisely, it 
means the auditor carries out his or her work without bias and undue influence.  
The independence factor has been looked into by previous researchers such as in the 
study of audit expectation gap. However, Brandon (2003:11) affirmed that no formal 
theory of auditor independence currently exists. Izedonmi (2000:83) discussed the three 
types of auditor independence which are programming, investigative and reporting 
independence. Programming independence has been described as the ability of an auditor 
to plan his or her audit work properly and obtain all necessary information during the 
course of the audit exercise. Investigative independence is the ability of an auditor to 
carry out an audit exercise based on the planned audit without undue influence either 
within or outside the organization. Finally, reporting independence is the ability of an 
auditor to report fearlessly to shareholders without the management or any other outsider 
influencing the audit opinion. Similarly, there should be no influence by the management 
or any third party in all these types of independence.  
In addition, Adeniji (2004:60-61) identified some of the threats to auditor independence 
which are self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation threat. Due to 
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the negative effects these threats have on the performance of an auditor’s responsibilities, 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and the Company and Allied 
Matters Act (1990) as amended have made provisions to ensure that an auditor is 
independent. The CAMA (1990) as amended specifies the process of appointing, 
disqualifying, remunerating, removing, resignation and rights of an auditor. In appointing 
an auditor, statutorily shareholders are responsible. However, the management may 
recommend and then allow shareholders to ratify. This is to ensure that management does 
not appoint persons they can easily manipulate. In reality however, it is the management 
that appoints auditors. Even though the selection of independent auditors for public 
liability companies is at the annual general meetings, it has been argued that the choice of 
which firm to promote is usually made by the board well in advance of the meeting. The 
shareholder vote is almost always a purely pro forma proceeding, whereas the actual 
selection responsibility lies with the board (Colley, Doyle, Logan and Stettinius, 
2003:234). Gloeck (1993) in a study of the audit expectation gap in South Africa found 
that almost 60% of the knowledgeable respondents were of the opinion that the auditor is 
strongly influenced by the management of the company which he/she audits and 70% of 
stockbrokers were of the same opinion. Conversely, 42% of persons in public practice did 
not support this view.  
The Nigerian context may be a pointer to inadequate education in the area of auditor’s 
independence. This is because some persons do not attach much importance to attending 
annual general meetings of companies by shareholders. An auditor is automatically 
disqualified from auditing the financial statements of a company if there is any close 
relationship with any director of that company. According to CAMA (1990) as amended, 
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the auditor is remunerated by persons who appointed him or her. However, in practice 
this is a crucial aspect of breach of independence as the auditor is remunerated by 
management. For anyone to remove an auditor there should be a written representation by 
the auditor explaining why he or she should not be removed from office. Also, the auditor 
has certain rights to ensure that the audit work is carried out without inhibitions.  
Similarly, the ICAN has professional ethics that safeguard the independence of an auditor 
(Izedonmi, 2000:86). Even though these rules exist, auditor independence may be 
influenced by client importance, provision of consulting services, increased auditor 
tenure (Brandon, 2003:11). The provision of non-audit services and audit tenure is our 
focus in studying the independence factor. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) requires public quoted companies to reveal the non-audit services provided by 
their auditors. Perhaps it is because if material/financial interests set in, the independence 
of an auditor may be threatened.  
In the history of audit in the United States, the Macdonald Commission was perceived to 
recommend a ban or severe restriction on provision of management consulting services to 
audit clients, rotating audit appointments, joint audits or set up an independent standard 
setting body like the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Actually, the 
commission’s objectives buttressed on strengthening the independence of auditors, 
enhancing professionalism, improving the quality of financial disclosure, reduce the 
public misunderstanding of the auditor’s role through public advertising and educational 
campaign. In addition, they advocated that a more explicit audit report be adopted that 
will explain the auditor’s role better (Bologna and Lindquist, 1995:72).  
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The recent accounting scandals have created a crisis of confidence in financial reporting 
(Mitschow and Asgray, 2004:54). In return, the U.S. Congress had passed legislation 
threatening public accounting’s professional autonomy. Independence is crucial in 
ensuring that users are able to rely on the financial statements. Mitschow and Asgary 
(2004:54) asserted that auditor independence is arguably the most important issue facing 
the public accounting profession today. In examining the impact of non-audit services on 
auditor independence, the U.S. Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the Public Oversight Board (POB), the AICPA and academics reached some 
conclusions.  
There was evidence of loss of independence through Mandatory Advisory Services 
(MAS) which may cause an auditor to consciously or subconsciously subordinate his or 
her judgment to a client’s desires. In addition, there has been more concern over non-
audit services than auditing by management of audit firms. The history of non-audit 
services were traced by the AICPA to requests by clients for additional services that their 
auditors seemed best suited or capable of providing, as well as from the special skills 
needed to audit new and complex business transactions (Chapter 5:110). Ironically, the 
organization that auditors are auditing is paying the bill. In some cases, auditors are 
scared of losing high profile clients due to the financial fortunes they get. It is almost 
difficult for an auditor to be independent under these circumstances (Colley, Doyle, 
Logan and Stettinius, 2003:234). It seems audit is carried out just for the books and not 
for the future. Preferably, to guard auditor’s independence fees from non-audit services 
should not be greater than fees from audit services. Where there is too much financial 
interest in the client there is question whether independence will be maintained. 
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Mitschow and Asgray (2004:55) identified that the relationship between audit opinion 
and turnover goes to the heart of external auditor independence.  
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen failed to act independently because they received fees 
for auditing as well as consultancy services and exchanged employees on a regular basis 
with Enron. Also, Enron’s auditor earned fees from organizing the SPEs (Deakin and 
Konzelmann, 2004:139). Another issue synonymous with auditor’s independence is the 
testing of transactions. Shaub (2004:169) opined that since auditors do not test every 
transaction, they must choose when to trust their clients. External auditors may rely on 
the work done by internal auditors in a company in carrying out his or her work. 
However, the extent of trust needs to be affirmed since management pays the internal 
auditor whose objectivity may be impossible to ascertain. Consequently, external auditors 
may just be pleasing management when they do not rely on an objective internal auditor.  
Emotional trust and deep auditor-client interdependence are some threats to auditor 
independence. Emotional trust as described by Shaub (2004:174) arises from a continuing 
relationship over time that may have been initiated as a result of a rational trust 
calculation. This creates a tendency that auditors work on the same clients year after year 
because they have established relationships with the clients. Also, due to their 
understanding of the client’s business, clients anticipate they will be more efficient on the 
job. On the first audit, auditors are likely to reduce dependence on the work of the client 
(through the internal auditor) than subsequent times.  
Where there is too much trust of the client, the ability of auditors to protect the interest of 
the public may be questioned. Trust may be interpreted as pleasing management. A 
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probable solution to protecting the objectivity of auditors may therefore be preventing 
them from providing non-audit and audit services for the same client at a given point in 
time. In some cases, these non-audit services may be audited by the same auditors. This 
issue was addressed in the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) in the ban of auditors of public 
companies from providing non-audit services to the same client.  
In the United States, the Sarbanes Oxley Act imposes rules aimed at enhancing the 
independence of directors and auditors, with the aim of more precisely aligning 
managerial behavior with the interests of shareholders (Deakin and Konzelmann, 
2004:134). Nigeria’s response to corporate scandals has mainly been out of court. Take 
the Cadbury case for example, where the auditors were not indicted and were only made 
to pay a fine.  
Auditors can be independent when they are not in positions that will likely make them 
compromise. Shaub (2004:180) suggested some options available to auditors where they 
are tempted to be too interdependent on the client. They are audit rotation, a willingness 
to confront clients, assignment of auditors with greater skepticism to clients where deep 
interdependence is a potential problem, becoming less dependent on the client when 
conducting an audit and adopting a stricter review of the auditor-client 
dependence/interdependence during planning. Auditor rotation either from firm to firm or 
within the firm at manager and partner levels will likely restrain emotional commitment 
to similar goals. Auditors may need to be willing to stand up to clients thereby 
experiencing less emotional commitment to them. However, they may not be able to do 
so when they are too dependent on their clients.  
46 
 
It is necessary for auditors to get adequate information from their clients to reduce 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry occurs when management do not want 
to disclose some categories of information to the auditors or owners of a company. Shaub 
(2004:180) suggested that an auditor may adopt surprise auditing. This affords the auditor 
to tap into client information to perform analytical procedures at any time during the year 
without the client’s prior approval provides auditors with a practical independence. On 
the other hand, there could be a second partner review that ensures the independence of 
the first partner. This partner adopts skepticism which is more of a critical approach to 
auditing. This partner is likely to be more independent since his or her success is not tied 
to the first auditor (Shaub, 2004:181).  
2.7 Approaches to Reduce the Audit Expectation Gap  
The expectations gap is considered to be one of the major issues confronting the 
accountancy profession (Sikka, Puxty, Willmott and Cooper, 1998:299). Some 
suggestions have been made to reduce the audit expectation gap. These vary from issuing 
an expanded audit report that will inform users of what auditors actually do, carry out 
education of the public on the duties of an auditor, broaden the role of auditors in the area 
of fraud detection and strengthen the independence of auditors. Lee and Ali (2008:5) 
advocated that a better remedy to the present day accusation crisis in the accounting 
profession is to redefine the role of auditors in order to be closer to the public 
expectations. In their study, they had argued that auditors of tomorrow have to live up to 
the expectations of the public, maintain high professionalism, and uphold the good 
reputation of the auditing profession. For some reasons expressed by the MacDonald 
Commission, audit education may not be effective in reducing the audit expectation gap 
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since some of the public expectations are achievable by the auditors (Ojo, 2006:4). Lee 
and Ali (2008:24) suggested that attention should be given to the reasonable expectations 
of auditors which are not required by existing standards on auditing.  
In addition, enforcement measures are required for regulators so that the audit standards 
are applied to improve the quality of audit. Gloeck (1998:10) emphasized that these 
standards are considered crucial as they represent a formal, published record of how the 
work of an auditor should be conducted. Alternative approaches exist for regulatory 
bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) in ensuring that the integrity of the corporate world is 
maintained and that illegal acts are brought to book.  
2.7.1 Understanding the Role of Other Players in the Capital 
Market 
The players in the capital market range from the directors, management, regulators, and 
professionals including external auditors, stockbrokers, investment bankers and analysts. 
These persons make up the team to which the present situation in the Nigerian capital 
market can be attributed. External auditors come once in a year to carry out their 
responsibility even though it has been advised that to maintain their integrity they can 
schedule their tasks and depend less on the management when they finally come. The 
task of statutory audit is once in a year and it may be impracticable to know in detail all 
that happened during the course of the year except with the cooperation of management.  
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The senior management has the primary task of seeing to the daily affairs of a company. 
However, delegation of responsibilities is synonymous to that level that it may be 
impracticable to carry out every task. A way of being carried along by junior officers is 
by setting the tone of effective internal control. An internal control mechanism such as 
safeguarding the reporting lines and ensuring proper authorization promotes good 
communication. At this level of management, a tone of integrity is set that flows down to 
all other persons in the company. The absence of such culture in a company is a pointer 
to serious problems in the future (Colley, Doyle, Logan and Stettinius, 2003:232).  
When a company fails, persons are quick to point at the independent auditor. However, 
the closest persons to ensure a culture of honesty in a company are the senior 
management. In some cases they act in their self-interest and this is the major reason why 
external audit is a must for public quoted companies. To safeguard good corporate 
governance other players apart from the auditor are needed. These persons need to have 
the right goals and set the company in the right direction by employing high quality staff 
and imposing penalty for fraudulent behavior. The objective of ensuring a corporate 
Nigeria void of scandals cannot be achieved without the senior management.  
The audit function, internal and external has been identified by Okaro (2005:21) as the 
most important tool for safeguarding the integrity of the capital market. The internal audit 
function is carried out by the internal auditors and the audit committee oversees the work 
of the external auditor. However, the extent to which the audit committees have 
succeeded has been identified to be related to its membership. Consequently, it has been 
advocated that more shareholders than directors should be appointed as members of this 
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committee. On the other hand, it has been argued that until non-executive directors who 
are independent take up their responsibilities, audit committees may not be effective.  
For the external audit function to be more effective there is need for increased integrity 
and objectivity since the organization they are auditing is paying the bill. Other capital 
market players such as the investment analysts, bankers and market makers promote 
stocks and are money-driven since they depend on persons buying or selling to earn fees. 
Analysts provide recommendation and are paid on the volume of shares moved. The 
investment system is filled with conflict of interest issues. However, the investors are at a 
high risk because they are least informed about the actual events. In this case, the analyst 
can shed further light on investment issues for the investor to understand (Colley, Doyle, 
Logan and Stettinius, 2003:232-233).  
The professional auditors are guided by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria 
(ICAN). This body has a role to play in ensuring that the dignity of the capital market in 
Nigeria is protected. Taking a clue from ACCA after the Enron scandal occurred in 
America, some proposals were made to reduce the audit expectation gap. They include 
making the appointment of external auditors less dependent on the executive directors 
and more dependent on the non-executive directors, audit committees and shareholders; 
limits on the ability of audit firms to offer consulting services to listed company audit 
clients; fuller disclosure of audit and consulting fees in the annual reports; mandatory 
review by a company’s audit committee of the independent status of the external 
auditors; and a prohibition on audit firms providing audit service in instances where audit 
staff have moved to senior executive roles in client companies (Okaro, 2005:21).  
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Similarly, in Nigeria Okaro (2005:21) found that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is working closely with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria (ICAN) to introduce rotational audit. The profession has also adjusted the audit 
fees since one of the causes of the audit expectation gap is inadequate performance of 
auditors with respect to their responsibilities. Some auditors have argued that 
inexperienced professionals are often deployed to perform audit jobs because of the 
unwillingness of clients to pay for audit services. This is buttressed by the willingness of 
audit firms to settle cases of negligence out of court rather than justify the quality of their 
audit services (Omoregie, 2001).  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a responsibility to ensure that 
investors are supplied with adequate information (Scott, 2003:455). Therefore it plays a 
pivotal role in ensuring the integrity of the capital market. However, an area that needs to 
be looked into is that of adequate funding of the commission. The cost of regulation is 
quite high and in more developed countries like America the SEC is usually funded by 
the government. Adequate funding of the commission will enable it stay ahead of the 
market it is regulating. In safeguarding the integrity of companies operating in the capital 
market, Okaro (2005:19) revealed that SEC is fashioning out code of corporate 
governance for Nigerian publicly quoted companies, promptly investigating financial 
scams, joining force with ICAN and the Nigerian Accounting Standards Board (NASB) 
to review auditing and accounting standards for publicly quoted companies, 
commissioning the Peterside committee on corporate governance and embarking on 
training of stakeholders especially directors of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria.  
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2.7.2 The Role of Education  
Of the many approaches suggested for reducing the audit expectation gap in some 
countries of the world, education of the public has been advocated by Monroe and 
Woodliff (1993:61-78), Siddiqui and Nasreen (2004:7-9) and Ojo (2006:4). It has been 
advocated that either professional education (Monroe and Woodliff, 1993:62) or informal 
education (Ali, Yusof, Mohamad and Lee, 2007) may help in reducing the audit 
expectation gap. Audit expectation gaps have been found to exist mainly in areas of 
auditor’s responsibilities, independence and third party liability (Lin and Chen, 2004:93). 
In the area of auditor’s responsibilities the society needs to understand the statutory role 
of the external auditor. This is to forestall a situation where the auditor is perceived as 
incapable to maintain the integrity of financial information. Especially as Njidda 
(2000:36) envisaged some changes which may make the Chartered Accountant of the 21st 
Century in Nigeria or abroad to be more of a value-added than an information provider. 
The public also needs to be enlightened on the extent of the auditor’s responsibilities in 
the area of fraud detection. In Nigeria for example, professional education may be two 
ways. First, professional accountants are exposed to Mandatory Continuing Professional 
Education (MCPE) on the platform of ICAN. Secondly, since audit users are increasing 
as a result of participation in the capital market they need to be enlightened.  
The audit report is a means of communication through which an auditor expresses 
opinion on the financial statements. However, the users may need to be educated on the 
extent of reliance that can be placed on an audit report. It has been argued by Colley et al 
(2003:233) that the investor who is at most risk is the least informed in the capital 
market. A means through which this gap can be bridged is to educate them on investment 
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issues and other factors associated with maintaining the credibility of the financial 
statements. Perhaps, if they know that there are other players other than the auditor who 
can protect their interest, they may be less dependent on the auditor.  
Also, Monroe and Woodliff (1993:62-68) in their study examined the effects of 
professional education on undergraduate auditing students’ beliefs about the messages 
communicated through audit reports. The study was carried out using two groups of 
undergraduate final year students (in auditing and marketing). Due to the level of 
knowledge of auditing students, they believed that auditors assumed less and 
management more responsibility for maintaining records, safeguarding assets, preventing 
and detecting fraud. The study revealed that students were more familiar with the 
auditing standards than some auditors, who may not have examined the standards for a 
number of years. Also, the students had no practical experience which may influence 
their beliefs. In addition, the students may have treated the questionnaire as a test and 
responded with the right answers even though they were persuaded that regardless of 
their answer, their responses were anonymous. The major highlight of the research was 
that the opinion of auditing students changed with education with regard to the 
responsibility, reliability of financial information and future prospects of the company.  
Similarly, Bostick and Luehlfing (2004:54) advocated that educating shareholders on 
what an audit is designed to accomplish and communicating what an auditor’s 
responsibilities are, will reduce the gap between the users’ expectation of the auditor and 
the reasonable expectations. This may be done at annual shareholder meetings and at 
other meetings created for the purpose of educating users (Ojo, 2006:10). Educating users 
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of the different responsibilities of directors and auditors has a cost. The question therefore 
is if management can afford the cost and avoid the inherent information asymmetry 
problem. On the other hand, the regulators may shoulder this cost. 
2.7.3 Improving the Independence of Auditors  
It has been emphasized in the accounting literature that auditors need to be independent 
to maintain the integrity of financial information. Ojo (2006:10) inferred that the issue of 
auditor independence relates to the role of the auditor. Consequently, where an auditor 
compromises due to inadequate independence, it could lead to deficient performance and 
increase the audit expectation gap. Independence is vital for an auditor. The failed 
companies in some parts of the world elicited the response of regulatory bodies and the 
accounting profession. Lee and Ali (2008) revealed that almost all large accounting firms 
had to split their consulting arms into separate companies, made announcements on more 
stringent rules and took measures to enhance independence and audit quality. In the 
United States of America (USA) it is no surprise that the Sarbanes Oxley Act was 
enacted in 2002 mainly to address issues relating to the independence of auditors. The 
Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to establish 
auditing, quality control, ethics and independence standards to be used by registered 
public accounting firms in the preparation and issuance of audit reports (Bostick and 
Luehlfing, 2004:58).  
Over the years, changes have been made to the audit report. In the face of mistakable, 
Boyd et al (2001:59) noted that there is a problem if the public mistakenly believes that 
financial statements reflect current values, or that an audit guarantees management’s 
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performance or a company’s future. On the part of auditors, a problem may arise if 
auditors think financial reporting shouldn’t change or that they shouldn’t be concerned 
about management controls or a company’s future prospects. In event of public demands 
Boyd et al (2001:59) revealed that in closing the gap, public expectations for an audit 
need to be brought closer to reality. They advocated that in the long term, the audit 
profession needs to expand services and undergo a fundamental change in attitude from 
self-defense-self-preservation to meeting society’s expectations. Such re-orientation also 
means an expansion of services, including more work to detect frauds and more internal 
control audits and disclosures.  
2.8 Summary 
The criticisms of the auditing profession are a proof that there are areas of dissatisfaction 
with the services provided by auditors and perhaps the general nature of auditing. 
However, auditors are faced with changing expectations of the public. This may not be 
peculiar to the times we are in because there are always changing expectations. At every 
point in time, users of audited financial statements want information that is free from 
bias. Thus, they rely on the external auditor who gives an independent opinion on the 
financial statements. The problem however, is that the auditor is expected to carry out 
some roles that are not statutorily defined. Only recently, the ISA guidelines have made 
clear the auditor’s responsibility to consider fraud in an audit of financial statements.  
From this move, the profession has recognized that the need of the users be met. 
However, more can be done by the players in the corporate world especially those 
concerned with corporate governance. Education of the users of the responsibilities of 
55 
 
auditors may be a useful tool in reducing the audit expectation gap. It is however 
expedient that auditor performs their duties diligently to prevent business failures. With 
the development of the accounting profession in Nigeria, there is need for auditors to be 
aware of their pivotal role in ensuring public confidence. This they must achieve to be 
relevant and remain in a competitive corporate world. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter information about method used in collecting primary and secondary data, 
research design, population of study, sample size and sampling technique, actual field 
work and data analysis method is provided. 
3.1 Research Design 
This study adopts an explanatory survey research design. It is limited by the hypothesis, 
research questions and objectives stated in chapter one. The study will use primary data 
gathered by means of questionnaires. Even though the study covers the business 
landscape of Nigeria, the sample size will be limited to four hundred (400) respondents 
selected conveniently as time permitted. The respondents will include a hundred (100) 
each of accountants, auditors, shareholders and lenders employees. The accountants are 
persons who belong to a professional accountancy body and are either in practice or work 
in companies as accountants or internal auditors, auditors belong to audit firms, lenders 
employees represent those persons who work in the banking sector and investors 
represent shareholders (who have shares in one or more companies in Nigeria). 
Secondary data will be gathered from journals, research papers, newspapers, internet sites 
and selected annual reports of some companies in Nigeria. 
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3.2 Population of Study 
According to Agbonifo and Yomere (1999:106) the population is made up of the entire 
universe to which the findings are generalized. In this vein, the population of this study 
will consist of the entire Nigerian business climate made up of auditors and audit 
beneficiaries (professionally qualified accountants-practicing and employed in 
companies, lenders employees/bankers and investors/stockbrokers).  
3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques 
Sampling provides a valid alternative to a census when it would be impracticable to 
survey the entire population due to the budget, time constraints and urgent need for 
results after collecting the data (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007:206). Similarly, 
Agbonifo and Yomere (1999:116) highlighted four reasons for studying a sample in place 
of the population. They sounded that statistics computed from sample data are reasonable 
accurate, cheaper in financial terms, time saving and avoids destroying the entire 
population.  
In this light, the researcher will organize the research population into four (4) groups 
which are auditors, accountants (preparers of financial statements), lenders employees 
and investors. Subsequently, samples of a hundred (100) persons each will be selected 
conveniently from the groups as time permits. The accountants, auditors, lender 
employees/bankers and investors/stockbrokers will be selected from some of the private 
and public limited liability companies, audit firms, banks and population of shareholders 
of quoted companies in Lagos and Ogun state.  
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3.4 Data Gathering Method 
This section reveals the sources of data and instruments of data collection. Furthermore, 
the questionnaire has been described in this section.  
3.4.1 Sources of Data 
Primary data will be gathered through the use of questionnaires and interviews. The 
questionnaires will be administered by the researcher with the help of a research assistant. 
Interviews will be conducted as well and information solicited from respondents will be 
written in notes. Secondary data will be gathered from journals, magazines, newspapers, 
annual report of companies, internet databases and library catalogues in Nigeria such as 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) library and Covenant 
University library. To identify whether familiarity threat exists with respect to the 
independence of auditors, the external auditors will be identified that have audited 
companies in the petroleum and breweries sectors in Nigeria selected conveniently for the 
past five to ten years. 
3.4.2 Instruments for Data Collection 
Asika (2004:75) described the questionnaire as an instrument for gathering data beyond 
the easy physical reach of the researcher. Due to the survey nature of the research, 
questionnaires will be used to solicit data pertaining to the audit expectation gap in 
Nigeria.  
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3.4.3 Description of Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is designed to examine the opinion on matters relating to auditing and 
auditors largely similar to those used in soliciting opinion on such matters in other 
environments. It will contain a cover letter and a brief background to the study. It will 
also be stated that no personal information would be disclosed with the results of the 
study. The questionnaire will be made up of five sections in similar manner to the 
previous studies by Best, Buckby and Tan (2001), Schelluch and Gay (2006), Siddiqui 
and Nasreen (2004), Saha and Baruah (2008). A four (4) point likert scale will be used in 
measuring the factors contributing to the audit expectations gap in Nigeria.  
The questionnaire will be divided into five sections (A, B, C, D and E). In section A the 
respondents will be required to fill in general information. From section B to E, 
respondents will be required to choose from a likert scale of 4 to 1. In section B to E, 
respondents will be required to respond to statements based on this four (4) point likert 
scale. These statements are made up of claims with respect to responsibility, reliability, 
nature and meaning of audit report messages and independence factor. Section B will be 
made up of statements pertaining to the auditor’s roles and duties. In section C statements 
will be made with respect to the reliability factor. Section D will cover the nature and 
meaning of audit report messages factor. Finally, in section E statements relating to the 
independence factor will be made.  
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3.4.4 Validity and Reliability of Instruments 
In this study, reliability was carried out to ensure the number of items encoded using 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences are correct. According to Pallant (2003:87) the 
responsibility, reliability, nature and meaning of audit report messages and independence 
scale has good internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient reported of more 
than 0.7. In this study the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.818. This value is above 0.7, 
so the scale is considered reliable with our sample. Content validity as described by 
Pallant (2003:7) is the adequacy with which a measure or scale has sampled from the 
intended universe or domain of content. A pilot study was conducted by serving the 
questionnaires to five (5) each of accountants in practice and investors. On two different 
occasions, questionnaires were administered to these persons. The scores of the 
respondents on the two occasions were compared and found in agreement.  
3.4.5 Administration of Instruments 
Questionnaires were administered to four groups of respondents namely persons working 
in audit firms specializing in audit, investors, lenders employees and accountants. The 
instruments were administered to the different groups at the same time. The researcher 
targeted the big audit firms where there are sufficient auditors in practice who also belong 
to a professional body. The reason for this is that this group of auditors has knowledge of 
the nature of auditing and other issues associated with auditors. However, not every 
auditor working in an audit firm may be professionally qualified. The overall usable 
response rate was 67%. Even though the response of the accountants was low, the results 
were checked to ensure that the overall results from the statistical analysis were not 
biased by this group. 
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3.5 Actual Field Work/ Location of Study 
This study was carried out in Lagos and Ogun State in Nigeria. The researcher 
administered questionnaires to auditors in KPMG audit, Akintola Williams Deloitte, 
Ernst and Young in Lagos. Questionnaires were administered to investors in the 
investment houses, bankers in selected banks in Lagos and Ogun States and accountants 
in business located in some companies Lagos and Ogun State. It was a difficult task 
getting the auditors to fill the questionnaires because a lot of them were on the field too 
(carrying out auditing tasks of different companies). But for this the response rate for 
auditors would have been more. However, some of the questionnaires were not properly 
completed and the researcher had to do without them. Annual reports were selected 
conveniently from some quoted companies in Nigeria. The petroleum and breweries 
sectors were focused on during the analysis. Respondents were located in Ogun state 
mainly because of the level of industrial development in the state. This enabled the 
researcher capture more accountants and investors.  
3.6 Data Analysis Method 
The first step to data analysis was coding the variables in the questionnaires into 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15. Secondly, the data from 
questionnaires were also coded into SPSS. The data was analyzed to bring out the 
descriptives (frequency tables) and then the means of the responses were compared after 
which advanced test was carried out using one-way analysis of variance and factor 
analysis. One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is a particularly powerful tool for 
testing the difference in means of groups of respondents. Also, Kerr, Hall and Kozub 
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(2003:114) advocated that one-way ANOVA can examine the differences between the 
means of more than two treatment groups.  
3.6.1 Method of Data Analysis 
The data collected will be analyzed in tables using sum of frequencies. The responses of 
the four groups of respondents were compared. A higher mean shows a higher support of 
that particular group for that statement by that group of respondent. In this study, the 
hypotheses are tested to ensure that if there are mean differences, it is not as a result of 
sampling error. The null hypothesis will be accepted if the level of significance calculated 
by SPSS is higher than the assumed level of significance (0.01). On the other hand the 
null hypothesis will be rejected if the level of significance calculated by SPSS is lower 
than the assumed level of significance.  
3.6.2 Instruments for Data Analysis (formulae) 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15 will be used to analyze the 
primary data collected through questionnaires. Data will be analyzed using Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA). The formula for ANOVA is given below: 
Total sum of squares SST=∑X2-(∑X)2/N 
Sum of squares between groups is SSB=∑Ng(Xg-X)2 
Sum of squares within groups (the error) SSW=SST-SSB 
Degree of freedom between groups=dfB=k-1 where k is the number of groups 
Degree of freedom within groups=dfW=N-k where N is the total number of observations 
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Total degrees of freedom is N-1 
Mean Squares of Between groups=SSB/dfB 
Mean squares of within groups=SSW/dfW 
Fishers ratio =MSSB/MSSW       
The critical value of F-statistic using the F table will then be obtained at α=0.01. If the 
calculated F value using SPSS is less than the assumed level of significance, the null 
hypothesis will be rejected. It means there is a significant difference between the means 
of the groups. In carrying out Factor Analysis, data will be reduced to factors that make 
up the audit expectation gap problem. Secondly, initial factors will be extracted. Then a 
rotation to the terminal solution will be carried out (Adedayo, 2000:264). Secondary data 
collected from annual reports of companies will be presented in tabular form.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the four hypotheses formulated based on the research problem 
stated in chapter one. The data obtained from the questionnaires distributed to one 
hundred (100) each of auditors, accountants, bankers and investors is presented in this 
chapter. The basis of our conclusion in this study is the result of the statistical test of one-
way Analysis of Variance on the hypotheses. The responses are classified according to 
their academic qualification, professional qualification in accounting, audit experience 
and occupation.  
4.1 Data Presentation (Using Tables) 
The following tables are the result of data collected from the field survey. The response 
of the auditors is compared with that of accountants, investors/stockbrokers and 
bankers/lender employees.  
Table 4.1.1 Highest Academic Qualification of Respondents 
 Occupation  
Highest Academic 
Qualification 
Bankers Auditors Investors  Accountants Total 
WAEC 0 0 41 0 41 
OND 7 8 5 7 27 
HND 20 20 20 18 78 
B Sc. 12 24 17 11 64 
BA 3 11 3 4 18 
MBA 3 10 5 5 23 
M Sc. 4 1 3 2 10 
Ph D. 2 1 1 0 4 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: From the table above, 75 auditors who responded. Of this number, 8 are 
OND holders, 20 are HND holders, 24 have their B Sc., 11 are BA holders and 10 are 
MBA holders. Only 2 auditors have their M Sc. and Ph D. respectively. Of the 51 bankers 
who responded, 7 are OND holders, 20 are HND holders, 12 are B Sc. holders, 3 persons 
each have BA and MBA degrees, 4 persons have M Sc and 2 have Ph D. Of the 95 
investors, 41 are WAEC holders, 5 are OND holders, 20 persons have HND, 17 have B 
Sc, 3 each have BA and M Sc, 5 have MBA and 1 person has a Ph D. Of the 47 
accountants who responded, 7 are OND holders, 18 are HND holders, 11 have B Sc, 4 
have BA, 5 have MBA and 2 have M Sc degrees.  
 
Table 4.1.2 Professional Qualification in Accounting 
 Occupation  
Professional Qualification Bankers Auditors Investors  Accountants Total 
ACA 3 50 9 10 72 
ACCA 2 3 0 0 5 
ANAN - - - - - 
CPA 2 0 1 1 4 
None 44 22 85 36 187 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: Of the 75 auditors, fifty (50) are chartered accountants, three (3) have 
ACCA and twenty two (22) have no professional qualification in accounting. Three (3) 
bankers are chartered accountants, two (2) have ACCA, two are Certified Public 
Accountants (CPA) and forty four (44) have no professional qualification in accounting. 
A larger number of the auditor respondents are chartered accountants. Usually, these 
groups of persons have a good understanding of the external auditor’s responsibilities. 
Many of the investor, banker and accountant respondents do not have any professional 
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qualification in accounting. So their opinion will not be influenced by any residual 
knowledge of auditing.  
Table 4.1.3 Auditing Experience 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Yes 16 70 15 28 129 
No 35 5 80 19 139 
Total  51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: Of the seventy five (75) auditors who responded, seventy (70) of them had 
audit experience and five (5) had no audit experience. Sixteen (16) bankers had audit 
experience and thirty five (35) had no experience. Fifteen (15) investors/stockbrokers had 
audit experience and eighty (80) had none. Twenty eight (28) accountants had audit 
experience and nineteen (19) had none. 
Table 4.1.4 Length of Audit Experience 
 Occupation  
Length of Audit Experience Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Below 1 year 6 8 8 13 35 
1-10 years 10 43 7 14 74 
Above 10 years 0 18 1 1 20 
No experience 35 6 80 19 139 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: A higher number of auditor respondents have audit experience than the 
other respondents have. Also, a higher number of auditor respondents have had audit 
experience between one to ten years which is enough time for anyone to have knowledge 
in auditing.  
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Table 4.1.5 Occupation 
Occupation/Response Rate   
Bankers RR Auditors RR Investors RR  Accountants RR Total Total 
Response 
Rate 
51 51% 75 75% 95 95% 47 47% 268 67% 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: In all, fifty one (51) bankers/lender employees, seventy five (75) auditors, 
ninety five (95) investors/stockbrokers and forty seven (47) accountants responded 
positively and filled the questionnaire. However, ten (10) respondents filled the 
questionnaire given to them partially and this made them unusable for this research. The 
response rate for auditors is 75%, bankers are 51%, investors are 95% and accountants 
are 47%. The overall response rate is 67%.  
Table 4.1.6 Auditor’s Responsibility for Preparation of Financial 
Statements 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 11 55 39 21 126 
Disagree 3 15 3 2 75 
Agree 19 3 14 5 41 
Strongly Agree 18 2 32 9 61 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: The table above suggests that more auditors disagree that they have 
responsibility to prepare financial statements. More bankers and investors agree to the 
statement. More accountants on the other hand disagree to the statement. 
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Table 4.1.7 Auditor’s Responsibility for Expressing an Independent 
Opinion on the Financial Statements Based on their Audit 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 0 0 0 
Disagree 1 0 0 1 2 
Agree 14 2 18 6 40 
Strongly Agree 36 73 77 40 226 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: Of the 51 bankers who responded, 1 disagreed that auditors are 
responsible for expressing an independent opinion on the financial statement based on 
their audit while 50 affirmed this statement. Of the 75 auditors and 95 investors, none 
disagreed to this statement. 1 out of 47 accountants disagreed to this statement. 
 
Table 4.1.8 Auditor’s Responsibility to Verify Every Accounting 
Transaction Undertaken by a Company 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants  Total 
Strongly Disagree 0 24 5 2 31 
Disagree 9 27 8 4 48 
Agree 15 11 29 22 77 
Strongly Agree 27 13 53 19 112 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: Of the 51 bankers, 9 disagreed that the auditor is responsible for verifying 
every accounting transaction undertaken by a company, 42 agreed to this statement. More 
auditors (51 of them) disagreed to this statement. Interestingly, more investors and 
accountants expect the auditor to verify every accounting transaction undertaken by a 
company. 
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Table 4.1.9 Auditor’s Responsibility for Detecting all Fraud in a 
Company 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 7 39 3 3 52 
Disagree 8 28 14 8 58 
Agree 12 7 42 21 82 
Strongly Agree 24 1 36 15 76 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: More auditors disagreed that they are responsible for detecting all fraud in 
a company. Ironically, more bankers, investors and accountants agreed to this statement.  
 
Table 4.1.10 Auditor’s Responsibility for Preventing all Fraud in a 
Company 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 7 46 6 5 64 
Disagree 9 24 27 12 72 
Agree 19 3 34 22 78 
Strongly Agree 16 2 28 8 54 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: More auditors disagreed that they are responsible for preventing all fraud 
in a company. Ironically, more bankers, investors and accountants agreed to this 
statement.  
 
Table 4.1.11 Auditor’s Responsibility for an Effective System of 
Internal Control 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 39 5 5 51 
Disagree 1 20 13 10 44 
Agree 22 9 37 17 85 
Strongly Agree 26 7 40 15 88 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: More auditors disagreed that they are responsible for an effective system 
of internal control. Ironically, more bankers, investors and accountants agreed to this 
statement. 
 
Table 4.1.12 Auditor’s Exercise of Judgment in Selection of Audit 
Procedures 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 4 0 2 0 6 
Disagree 5 3 5 6 19 
Agree 27 28 43 26 124 
Strongly Agree 15 44 45 15 119 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, more respondents (auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants) agreed that the auditor exercises judgment in selection of audit procedures.  
Table 4.1.13 Auditors’ Additional Responsibility for Evaluating 
whether a Company is a Going Concern  
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 1 0 0 0 1 
Disagree 3 6 10 9 28 
Agree 25 35 45 20 125 
Strongly Agree 22 34 40 18 114 
Total 51 175 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of respondents are of the opinion 
that auditors should take on additional responsibility for evaluating whether a company is 
a going concern. This result is a pointer that auditors and audit beneficiaries alike want 
information about the future of a company.  
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Table 4.1.14 Auditors should take on Additional Responsibility for 
Communicating whether a Company is a Going Concern 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree - - - - - 
Disagree 4 11 16 10 41 
Agree 28 41 49 22 140 
Strongly Agree 19 23 30 15 87 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
 Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of respondents are of the opinion 
that auditors should take on additional responsibility for communicating whether a 
company is a going concern.  
 
Table 4.1.15 Auditor’s responsibility for Disclosing whether any Theft 
occurred during the Financial Year 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 5 14 2 3 24 
Disagree 5 27 14 6 52 
Agree 13 22 40 16 91 
Strongly Agree 28 12 39 22 101 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table, more auditors disagreed that they are responsible for 
disclosing whether any theft occurred during the financial year. Conversely, the bankers, 
investors and accountants opined otherwise.  
Table 4.1.16 Auditors are Responsible for Business Failure 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 8 42 15 12 77 
Disagree 14 23 30 18 85 
Agree 9 5 26 11 51 
Strongly Agree 20 5 24 6 55 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: From the table above, more auditors disagreed that they are liable for 
business failure. Conversely, the bankers and investors opined otherwise. The 
accountants also perceived that auditors are not liable for business failure.  
 
Table 4.1.17 Auditors should be Financially Liable when they do not 
Exercise Diligence in Handling the Accounts of a Company 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 2 1 2 7 
Disagree 6 17 14 5 42 
Agree 17 43 33 22 115 
Strongly Agree 26 13 47 18 104 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table, more respondents opined that the auditor should be 
financially liable when the accounts of a company are not handled diligently. A fewer 
number of respondents disagreed to this statement.  
Table 4.1.18 An Auditor is Responsible for Maintaining Public 
Confidence in a Company 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 9 2 1 14 
Disagree 3 7 7 4 21 
Agree 20 41 39 18 118 
Strongly Agree 26 18 47 24 115 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table, 233 out of 268 respondents agreed that auditors are 
responsible for maintaining public confidence in a company. This suggests that the role 
of auditors is held highly by users. 
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Table 4.1.19 An Auditor should Report to Shareholders on 
Management Efficiency 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 1 3 3 1 8 
Disagree 3 18 8 7 36 
Agree 22 27 31 18 98 
Strongly Agree 25 27 53 21 126 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table above, 224 out of 268 respondents opined that an auditor 
should report to shareholders on management efficiency. More auditors agreed to this 
statement, so did the bankers, investors and accountants.  
Table 4.1.20 An Unqualified Audit Report means that the Financial 
Statements is Free from Fraud 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 7 18 10 12 47 
Disagree 20 29 23 18 90 
Agree 12 19 34 9 74 
Strongly Agree 12 9 28 8 57 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers and 
accountants disagreed that an unqualified audit report means that the financial statement 
is free from fraud. Conversely, the investors opined otherwise (agreed). 
Table 4.1.21 An Unqualified Audit Report means that the Financial 
Statement is Free from Material Misstatements 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 4 4 9 6 23 
Disagree 20 1 13 14 48 
Agree 16 37 46 15 114 
Strongly Agree 11 33 27 12 83 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that an unqualified audit report means that the financial statement is 
free from material misstatements.  
Table 4.1.22 An Unqualified Audit Report can be Relied Upon to Make 
Investment Decisions 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 9 6 6 8 29 
Disagree 15 11 12 10 48 
Agree 17 41 44 20 122 
Strongly Agree 10 17 33 9 69 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that an unqualified audit report can be relied upon to make investment 
decisions.  
Table 4.1.23 A Company whose Audit Report is Unqualified is 
Financially Sound 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 9 14 10 11 44 
Disagree 18 38 19 18 93 
Agree 14 20 41 14 89 
Strongly Agree 10 3 25 4 42 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table above, more auditors and accountants disagreed that a 
company whose audit report is unqualified is financially sound. 27 bankers disagreed and 
24 agreed to the statement. Conversely, a higher number of investors agreed to the 
statement. 
 
82 
 
Table 4.1.24 Auditors are meant to Forecast Financial Profile  
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 7 38 8 10 63 
Disagree 9 28 22 16 75 
Agree 27 8 41 20 96 
Strongly Agree 8 1 24 1 34 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors disagreed that auditors 
are meant to forecast financial profile. Conversely, more bankers and investors agreed to 
the statement. The accountants disagreed to this statement as well. 
Table 4.1.25 The Audited Financial Statements are Useful in 
Monitoring a Company’s Financial Performance 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 1 0 1 0 2 
Disagree 3 3 6 2 14 
Agree 20 48 38 25 131 
Strongly Agree 27 24 50 20 121 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that the audited financial statements are useful in monitoring a 
company’s performance. 
Table 4.1.26 The Audited Financial Statements can be used in making 
Decisions Pertaining to the Sale and Purchase of Shares 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 0 0 1 3 
Disagree 6 10 5 2 23 
Agree 19 48 50 28 145 
Strongly Agree 24 17 40 16 97 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that the audited financial statements can be used in making decisions 
pertaining to the sale and purchase of shares. 
Table 4.1.27 An Unqualified Audit Report Means That A Company Is A 
Safe Investment Haven 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 9 11 6 8 34 
Disagree 19 40 25 19 103 
Agree 12 21 38 18 89 
Strongly Agree 11 3 26 2 42 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers and 
accountants disagreed that an unqualified audit report is a safe investment haven. 
Conversely, more investors agreed to the statement. 
Table 4.1.28 An Unqualified Audit Report Means That A Company Is 
Well Managed  
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 5 9 6 8 28 
Disagree 20 38 21 19 98 
Agree 15 26 43 17 100 
Strongly Agree 11 2 25 3 41 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors and accountants 
disagreed that an unqualified audit report means that a company is well managed. 
Conversely, more bankers and investors agreed to the statement. 
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Table 4.1.29 Audit Reports Should Contain More Information About 
Financial Forecast 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 1 13 5 3 22 
Disagree 8 37 22 12 79 
Agree 17 22 42 22 103 
Strongly Agree 25 3 26 10 64 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, more auditors disagreed that audit reports should 
contain more information about financial forecast. Conversely, a higher number of 
bankers, investors and accountants agreed to this statement.  
 
Table 4.1.30 The Extent Of Assurance Given By An Auditor Is Clearly Indicated In 
Audit Reports 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 3 2 1 0 6 
Disagree 2 6 12 7 27 
Agree 24 47 56 24 151 
Strongly Agree 22 20 26 16 84 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that the extent of assurance given by an auditor is clearly indicated in 
audit reports. 
Table 4.1.31 An Unqualified Audit Report Means That The Company 
Has Kept Proper Books Of Account And The Financial Statements Are 
In Agreement With The Books 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 10 5 7 11 33 
Disagree 14 9 14 12 49 
Agree 9 29 45 14 97 
Strongly Agree 18 32 29 10 89 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that an unqualified audit report means that the company has kept 
proper books of account and the financial statements are in agreement with the books.  
 
Table 4.1.32 The Extent Of Work Performed Should Be Clearly 
Communicated In Audit Reports 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 4 0 1 7 
Disagree 4 7 10 7 28 
Agree 19 44 7 28 134 
Strongly Agree 26 20 28 11 99 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that the extent of work performed should be clearly communicated in 
audit reports. 
Table 4.1.33 An Unqualified Audit Report Shows That The Financial 
Statements Show A True And Fair View Of The State Of Affairs Of A 
Company 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 3 4 4 6 17 
Disagree 13 4 14 7 38 
Agree 19 26 41 21 107 
Strongly Agree 16 41 36 13 106 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that an unqualified audit report shows that the financial statements 
shows a true and fair view of the state of affairs of a company.  
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Table 4.1.34 Auditor Independence Can Influence The Performance Of 
Audit Services 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 1 4 
Disagree 1 1 13 5 20 
Agree 21 23 33 17 94 
Strongly Agree 29 50 47 24 150 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that auditor independence can influence the performance of audit 
services.  
 
Table 4.1.35 When an Auditor Engages In The Provision Of Non-Audit 
And Audit Services At The Same Time, Objectivity May Be Impaired 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 0 1 1 4 
Disagree 4 2 14 9 29 
Agree 31 31 50 21 133 
Strongly Agree 14 42 30 16 102 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants agreed that when an auditor engages in the provision of non-audit and audit 
services at the same time, objectivity may be impaired.  
Table 4.1.36 Provision of Audit Services Consistently For A Long 
Period Of Time May Lead To Familiarity Threat 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 10 1 0 6 
Disagree 8 33 15 8 44 
Agree 21 6 56 18 128 
Strongly Agree 20 26 23 21 90 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors opined that provision of 
audit services consistently for a long period of time will not lead to familiarity threat. 
Conversely, a higher number of bankers, investors and accountants agreed to this 
statement. 
Table 4.1.37 Auditors Are Not Independent In The Nigerian Business 
Environment 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 1 22 5 2 30 
Disagree 10 35 27 18 90 
Agree 26 14 48 13 101 
Strongly Agree 14 4 15 14 47 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors disagreed that auditors 
are not independent in the Nigerian business environment. The other respondents agreed 
to this statement.  
Table 4.1.38 Auditors Are More Concerned With Pleasing Management 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 37 8 5 52 
Disagree 14 30 32 17 93 
Agree 25 6 42 18 91 
Strongly Agree 10 2 13 7 32 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: From the table above, a higher number of auditors disagreed that auditors 
are more concerned with pleasing management. Conversely, a higher number of bankers, 
investors and accountants agreed to this statement. 
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Table 4.1.39 Auditors Are Willing To Settle Negligence Out Of Court In 
Nigeria 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 10 6 1 19 
Disagree 9 31 34 11 85 
Agree 32 28 42 31 133 
Strongly Agree 8 6 13 4 31 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: The table above shows that a higher number of auditors disagreed that 
auditors are willing to settle negligence out of court in Nigeria. Conversely, a higher 
number of bankers, investors and accountants agreed to this statement. 
 
Table 4.1.40 The Quality Of Audit Has Improved In The Recent Years 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 0 2 1 5 
Disagree 23 8 48 24 93 
Agree 23 40 29 19 121 
Strongly Agree 3 27 16 3 49 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: The table above shows that a higher number of auditors and bankers 
opined that the quality of audit has improved in the recent years. Interestingly, a higher 
number of investors and accountants disagreed to this statement. 
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4.2 Data Analysis – Preliminary 
 
The primary aim of this section is to analyze the data collected using descriptive statistics 
such as means, standard deviations and present them in tabular form.  
4.2.1 Preliminary Data Analysis of Responsibility Factor 
 
Table 4.2.1 Survey Statements and Summary Statistics- Responsibility 
Factor 
 Auditors 
 
Bankers Investors Accountants 
Statements/Factors Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
1.Responsibility for Preparation of Financial Statements 1.3600 
(0.69048) 
2.8627 
(1.13172) 
2.4105 
(1.32494) 
2.0426 
(1.16016) 
2. Responsibility for expressing an independent opinion on 
the financial statement 
3.9733 
(0.16219) 
3.6863 
(0.50952) 
3.8105 
(0.39396) 
3.8358 
(0.43335) 
3. Responsibility for verifying every accounting transaction 2.1733 
(1.07015) 
3.3529 
(0.77003) 
3.3684 
(0.85119) 
3.2340 
(0.78610) 
4. Responsibility for detecting all fraud 1.6000 
(0.71660) 
3.0392 
(1.09473) 
3.1684 
(0.79430) 
3.0213 
(0.87201) 
5. Responsibility for preventing all fraud 1.4800 
(0.70443) 
2.8627 
(1.02019) 
2.8842 
(0.90933) 
2.7021 
(0.88256) 
6. Responsibility for an effective internal control 1.7867 
(0.99040) 
3.4118 
(0.72599) 
3.1789 
(0.86269) 
2.8936 
(0.98321) 
7. Responsibility for exercising judgment in selecting audit 
procedures 
3.5467 
(0.57641) 
3.0392 
(0.84760) 
3.3789 
(0.68694) 
3.1915 
(0.64735) 
8. Responsibility for evaluating the going concern status  3.3733 
(0.63189) 
3.3333 
(0.68313) 
3.3158 
(0.65661) 
3.1915 
(0.74128) 
9. Responsibility for communicating the going concern status 3.1600 
(0.65842) 
3.2941 
(0.60973) 
3.1474 
(0.68368) 
3.1064 
(0.72932) 
10. Responsibility for disclosing theft 2.4267 
(0.97500) 
3.2549 
(0.99686) 
3.2211 
(0.77431) 
3.2128 
(0.90737) 
11. Responsibility for business failure 1.6400 
(0.87980) 
2.8039 
(1.13172) 
2.6211 
(1.03327) 
2.2340 
(0.98274) 
12. Responsibility to pay fine when diligence is not exercised 
in handling accounts 
2.8933 
(0.70851) 
3.3137 
(0.83643) 
3.3263 
(0.76412) 
3.1915 
(0.79778) 
13. Responsibility for maintaining public confidence 2.9067 
(0.90305) 
3.3725 
(0.77358) 
3.3789 
(0.71725) 
3.3830 
(0.73878) 
14. Responsibility for reporting management efficiency to 
shareholders 
3.0400 
(0.87673) 
3.3922 
(0.69508) 
3.4105 
(0.77863) 
3.2553 
(0.79312) 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Table 4.2.1 above presents the data relating to perception of the responsibility of auditors. 
On the auditor’s responsibility for preparing the financial statements verifying every 
accounting transaction undertaken by a company, detecting all fraud, preventing all fraud, 
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ensuring an effective internal control, disclosing theft, business failure, pay fine when 
accounts are not handled diligently, maintaining public confidence, reporting 
management efficiency to shareholders, a lower support was shown by auditors (with the 
lowest mean scores) when compared with the mean of bankers, investors and accountants 
for the 10 statements. These data indicate that auditor respondents showed lower support 
for these 10 statements than other respondents.  
 
On the other hand, the mean for responsibility for expressing an independent opinion on 
the financial statements, exercising judgment in selecting audit procedures, evaluating 
and communicating the going concern status show a higher mean for the auditor group of 
3.9733, 3.5467, 3.3733 and 3.1600 than the mean for the other respondent groups on each 
of the statements. This suggests that auditor respondents strongly understand the main 
objective of statutory audit which is to express an independent opinion on the financial 
statements based on their audit. The mean scores for statements 7, 8, 9 and 14 were 
consistent for the four groups. In other words, the groups had related opinion regarding 
the auditor’s ability to exercise judgment in selection of audit procedures (agree), 
auditor’s responsibility for evaluating and communicating whether a company is a going 
concern (agree) and auditor’s report to shareholders on management efficiency (agree).  
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4.2.2 Preliminary Data Analysis of Reliability Factor 
 
Table 4.2.2 Survey Statements and Summary Statistics- Reliability 
Factor 
 Auditors 
 
Bankers Investors Accountants 
Statements/Factors Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
1.Unqualified audit report can be relied upon to make 
investment decisions 
2.9200 
(0.83440) 
2.5490 
(1.00625) 
3.0947 
(0.85145) 
2.6383 
(0.98743) 
2.Auditors forecast financial profile 1.6267 
(0.73104) 
2.7059 
(0.90098) 
2.8526 
(0.89880) 
2.2553 
(0.82008) 
3.Audited financial statements are useful in monitoring 
company’s performance 
3.2800 
(0.53423) 
3.4314 
(0.70014) 
3.4421 
(0.66390) 
3.3830 
(0.57306) 
4.Audited financial statements can be used in making 
decisions pertaining to the sale and purchase of shares 
3.0933 
(0.59669) 
3.2745 
(0.82652) 
3.3684 
(0.58442) 
3.2553 
(0.64160) 
5.Audit reports should contain more information about 
financial forecast 
2.2000 
(0.77110) 
3.2941 
(0.80732) 
2.9368 
(0.84816) 
2.8298 
(0.84233) 
6.Extent of assurance is clearly indicated in audit reports 3.1333 
(0.66441) 
3.2745 
(0.80196) 
3.1263 
(0.65626) 
3.1915 
(0.68010) 
7.Extent of work done is clearly communicated in audit 
reports 
3.0667 
(0.75933) 
3.3529 
(0.79558) 
3.3368 
(0.66221) 
3.0426 
(0.69023) 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Table 4.2.2 above presents the data relating to perception of the respondents regarding 
reliability of the audit report. Auditor respondents showed the lowest support for 
forecasting financial profile, usefulness of audited financial statements in forecasting 
financial profile and making decisions pertaining to the sale and purchase of shares, audit 
reports should contain more information about financial forecast than the other 
respondents. This was denoted by the lowest mean of 1.6267, 3.2800, 3.0933 and 2.2000 
among the respondents. Auditor respondents opined that even though an unqualified audit 
report is clean, it cannot be wholly depended on to make investment decisions, and audit 
reports do not communicate the extent of work done. However, the results from investor 
respondents on relying upon audit reports to make investment decisions is highest 
compared to the other respondents. This suggests that they have an unreasonable 
expectation of the audit report. Also, the mean for investors is highest with respect to 
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forecast of financial profile. This expectation may be traced to the blame of auditors for 
subsequent illiquidity of a company after an unqualified (clean) report is given by 
auditors.  
4.2.3 Preliminary Data Analysis of Nature and Meaning of 
Audit Report Messages 
 
Table 4.2.3 Survey Statements and Summary Statistics- Nature and 
Meaning of Audit Report Messages Factor 
 Auditors 
 
Bankers Investors Accountants 
Statements/Factors Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
1.Unqualified audit report is free from 
fraud 
2.2533 
(0.95992) 
2.5686 
(1.00509) 
2.8421 
(0.97102) 
2.2766 
(1.03634) 
2. Unqualified audit report is free from 
material misstatements 
3.3200 
(0.75624) 
2.6667 
(0.90921) 
2.9579 
(0.89818) 
2.7021 
(0.99815) 
3.Unqualified audit report means company 
is financially sound 
2.1600 
(0.77180) 
2.4902 
(1.00742) 
2.8526 
(0.93363) 
2.2340 
(0.91397) 
4.An unqualified audit report means a 
company is a safe investment haven 
2.2133 
(0.74059) 
2.4902 
(1.02708) 
2.8842 
(0.88562) 
2.2979 
(0.80528) 
5.An unqualified audit report means 
company is well managed 
2.2800 
(0.70825) 
3.1961 
(4.21910) 
2.9158 
(0.85879) 
2.3191 
(0.83683) 
6.An unqualified audit report means 
company has kept proper books 
3.1733 
(0.89100) 
2.6863 
(1.15741) 
3.0105 
(0.86903) 
2.4894 
(1.08091) 
7.An unqualified audit report means the 
financial statements show a true and fair 
view 
3.3867 
(0.82024) 
2.9412 
(0.90359) 
3.1474 
(0.82473) 
2.8723 
(0.96947) 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Table 4.2.3 above presents the data relating to perception of the respondents regarding 
the nature and meaning of audit report messages. Auditor respondents showed lowest 
support pertaining to the meaning of an unqualified audit report with respect to freedom 
from fraud, being financially sound, being a safe investment haven and company being 
well managed. On the other hand, the mean for auditor respondents was highest 
pertaining to the meaning of an unqualified audit report as free from material 
misstatements, that a company has kept proper books and the financial statements show a 
true and fair view. This suggests that the auditor respondents support these views highly 
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than the other respondents. The results showed that other respondents believe that an 
unqualified audit report infers that the financial statements are free from fraud; the 
company is financially sound and well managed when the auditor respondents perceive 
otherwise. The results suggest the presence of an audit expectation gap.  
4.2.4 Preliminary Data Analysis of Independence Factor 
 
In this section, the results of the survey statements and summary statistics are presented 
as well as the results from the annual statements of selected companies in the Nigerian 
Petroleum and Breweries sector.  
Table 4.2.4 Survey Statements and Summary Statistics- Independence 
Factor 
 Auditors 
 
Bankers Investors Accountants 
Statements/Factors Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
1.Auditor independence can influence the performance of 
audit services 
3.6267 
(0.58756) 
3.5490 
(0.54088) 
3.3158 
(0.78906) 
3.3617 
(0.76401) 
2.Objectivity may be impaired when providing non-audit 
and audit services at the same time 
3.5333 
(0.55345) 
3.1176 
(0.71125) 
3.1474 
(0.69906) 
3.1064 
(0.78668) 
3.Provision of audit services for a long period of time 
may lead to familiarity threat 
3.0800 
(0.85044) 
2.3333 
(0.97297) 
3.0632 
(0.66542) 
3.2766 
(0.74315) 
4.Auditors are not independent in Nigeria 2.0000 
(0.83827) 
3.0392 
(0.74728) 
2.7684 
(0.77806) 
2.8298 
(0.91649) 
5.Auditors are more concerned with pleasing 
management 
1.6400 
(0.74689) 
2.8431 
(0.78416) 
2.6316 
(0.82582) 
2.5745 
(0.87836) 
6.Auditors are willing to settle negligence out of court in 
Nigeria 
2.4000 
(0.82199) 
2.9020 
(0.70014) 
2.6526 
(0.79585) 
2.8085 
(0.61284) 
7.The quality of audit has improved in recent years 3.2533 
(0.63869) 
2.5294 
(0.67388) 
2.6421 
(0.78437) 
2.5106 
(0.65516) 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Table 4.2.4.1 above presents the data relating to perception of the respondents on auditor 
independence. Auditor respondents showed the highest support that auditor independence 
can influence the performance of audit services. The results showed that the investor, 
banker and accountant respondents know the importance of auditor independence. 
Auditors also strongly support that objectivity may be impaired when providing audit and 
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non-audit services at the same time. Ironically, the preparers of financial statement 
(accountants) showed the highest support for the statement that provision of audit 
services for a long period of time may lead to familiarity threat. The lowest support was 
shown by auditors pertaining to their not being independent, concerned with pleasing 
management and willing to settle negligence out of court. The preparers showed the 
lowest support that the quality of audit has improved in the recent years.  
4.2.5 Observation from Annual Reports of Selected Companies 
in the Nigerian Petroleum and Breweries Sector 
 
The results from the annual reports of some selected companies in the Nigerian 
Petroleum and Breweries sector are shown in the table and the results explained 
thereafter.  
Table 4.2.5 Tenure of Auditors in Selected Companies in Nigeria 
Sector  Auditors Number of Years Audit Services were 
Provided 
Breweries Guinness KPMG Audit 2002 to 2006 
Nigerian Breweries KPMG Audit 2002 to 2006 
 
 
 
Petroleum 
Mobil Pricewaterhouse Coopers 1999 to 2006 
 
Texaco 
Arthur Andersen 1985 to 2001 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2003 to 2005 
 
Total 
KPMG Audit 1996 to 2001 
Akintola Williams Deloitte and 
Touche 
2002 to 2005 
  
Source: Annual Reports of Companies 
Interpretation: The auditors who provided audit services during the year were noted. In 
the Breweries sector, a look at the annual statements of Guinness and Nigerian Breweries 
showed that KPMG audit had provided audit services for five (5) consecutive years up till 
2006. However, in 2002 they were known as KPMG audit and by 2003 as KPMG pro. In 
the Petroleum sector, the annual report of Mobil showed that for eight consecutive years 
(from 1999 up till 2006), their financial statements have been audited by Pricewaterhouse 
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Coopers. For eleven (11) years (from 1985 to 2001) Arthur Andersen provided audit 
services to Texaco until 2003 when Pricewaterhouse Coopers took over. As at 2005, 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers provided this service. The Case of Total shows that KPMG 
audit provided audit services for them for six (6) consecutive years (1996-2001). 
However, from 2002 to 2005 Akintola Williams Deloitte and Touche was their auditor.  
 
The above findings reveal that there may be no specified rules regarding the number of 
years an auditor can provide audit services to a client. However, if provision of audit 
services for a long period of time may lead to familiarity threat it is ideal that a specified 
number of years that an auditor can provide audit services to a client be stated.   
 
4.3 Data Analysis – Advanced 
 
To further analyze the data, one way analysis of variance was carried out. Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was used to identify the presence or absence of a significant 
difference in the perception of the four groups on each variable in the four point likert 
scale. The level of significance assumed was 1%. According to Adedayo (2000:218) 
when 0.01 level of significance is used, it means we are 99% confident that a right 
decision has been made. The responsibility, reliability, nature and meaning of audit report 
messages and independence factors were subjected to advanced test using one way 
ANOVA. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to carry out this test.  
4.3.1 Advanced Data Analysis of Responsibility Factor 
Tables 4.3.1.1 to 4.3.1.14 presents the responses to the fourteen (14) responsibility 
statements. It indicates the presence of an audit expectation gap which reflects in the 
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significant differences, in statements 1 (auditors are responsible for the preparation of the 
company’s financial statements), 2 (the auditor is responsible for expressing an 
independent opinion on the financial statements based on their audit), 3 (the auditor is 
responsible for verifying every accounting transaction undertaken by a company, 4 (the 
auditor is responsible for detecting all fraud in a company), 5 (the auditor is responsible 
for preventing all fraud in a company), 6 (the auditor is responsible for an effective 
internal control in a company), 7 (the auditor exercises judgment in the selection of audit 
procedures), 10 (the auditor is responsible for disclosing whether any theft occurred 
during the financial year), 11 (business failure means audit failure), 12 (auditors should 
be made to pay fine when they do not exercise diligence in handling the accounts of a 
company) and 13 (an auditor is responsible for maintaining public confidence in a 
company).  
In the tables below SS means Sum of Squares, df is the degree of freedom, MSS is the 
Mean Sum of Squares. 
Table 4.3.1.1 ANOVA Results on Statement 1 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 79.668 3  26.556  
21.491 
 
0.000 
Within groups 326.224 264 1.236 
Within total 405.892 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: From the table, there was a statistically significant difference at the p<0.01 
level in responsibility for preparation of financial statement score for the four groups [F 
(3,264)=21.491, p=0.000]. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for 
bankers and auditors, auditors and investors, accountants and bankers is significant at the 
0.01 level.  
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Table 4.3.1.2 ANOVA Results on Statement 2 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 2.621 3 .874 6.046 
 
0.001 
Within groups 38.155 264 .145 
Within total 40.776 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On the second statement, there was a statistically significant difference at 
the p<0.01 level on responsibility for expressing an independent opinion on the financial 
statements score for the four groups F[3,264]=6.046, p=0.001. Scheffe’s post-hoc test 
revealed that the mean score for bankers and auditors is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 4.3.1.3 ANOVA Results on Statement 3 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 73.061 3 24.354  
30.482 
 
0.000 
Within groups 210.925 264 .799 
Within total 283.985 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On the third statement, there was a statistically significant difference at the 
p<0.01 level on the auditor’s responsibility for verifying every accounting transaction 
undertaken by a company. This score for the four groups F [3,264]=30.482, p=0.000. 
Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for bankers and auditors, auditors 
and investors, auditors and accountants are significant at the 0.01 level.   
Table 4.3.1.4 ANOVA Results on Statement 4 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 122.197 3 40.732  
55.947 
 
0.000 
Within groups 192.206 264 .728 
Within total 314.403 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Pertaining to the fourth statement, there was a statistically significant 
difference at the p<0.01 level on the auditor’s responsibility for detecting all fraud in a 
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company. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=55.947, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc 
test revealed that the mean score for auditors and bankers, auditors and investors, auditors 
and accountants are significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 4.3.1.5 ANOVA Results on Statement 5 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 100.147 3 33.382 43.561 
 
0.000 
Within groups 202.315 264 .766 
Within total 302.463 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On the fifth statement, there was a statistically significant difference at the 
p<0.01 level on the auditor’s responsibility for preventing all fraud in a company. The 
score for the four groups F[3,264]=43.561, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that 
the mean score for auditors and bankers, auditors and investors, auditors and accountants 
are significant at the 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.1.6 ANOVA Results on Statement 6 
Source SS df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 110.082 3 36.694  
45.402 
 
0.000 
Within groups 213.366 264 .808 
Within total 323.448 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Regarding the sixth statement, there was a statistically significant 
difference at p<0.01 level on the auditor’s responsibility for an effective system of 
internal control in a company. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=45.402, p=0.000. 
Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for auditors and bankers, auditors 
and investors, auditors and accountants are significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 4.3.1.7 ANOVA Results on Statement 7 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 8.962 3 2.987  
6.353 
 
0.000 
Within groups 124.143 264 .470 
Within total 133.104 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Pertaining to the seventh statement, there was a statistically significant 
difference at p<0.01 level on the auditor’s exercise of judgment in selecting audit 
procedures. The scores for the four groups F [3,264]=6.353, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc 
test revealed that the mean score for bankers and auditors is significant at the 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.1.8 ANOVA Results on Statement 8 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups .989 3 .330  
.733 
 
.533 
Within groups 118.683 264 .450 
Within total 119.672 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On the eight statement, there was no statistically significant difference at 
p<0.01 level on the auditor’s responsibility for taking on additional responsibility for 
evaluating whether a company is a going concern. The score for the four groups F 
[3,264]=0.733, p=0.533. There was no need to carry out Scheffe’s post-hoc test. 
Table 4.3.1.9 ANOVA Results on Statement 9 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 1.031 3 .344  
.762 
 
.516 
Within groups 119.073 264 .451 
Within total 120.104 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On the ninth statement, there was no statistically significant difference at 
p<0.01 on the auditor’s responsibility for taking on additional responsibility for 
communicating whether a company is a going concern. The score for the four groups F 
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[3,264]=0.762, p=0.516. Scheffe’s post-hoc test was not carried out since there was no 
significant difference.  
Table 4.3.1.10 ANOVA Results on Statement 10 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 34.733 3 11.578  
14.265 
 
0.000 
Within groups 214.263 264 .812 
Within total 248.996 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Regarding the tenth statement, there was a statistically significant 
difference at p<0.01 on the auditor’s responsibility for disclosing whether any theft 
occurred during the financial year. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=14.265, 
p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test was carried out and it revealed that the mean score for 
auditors and bankers, auditors and investors, auditors and accountants are significant at 
the 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.1.11 ANOVA Results on Statement 11 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 55.569 3 18.523  
18.377 
 
0.000 
Within groups 266.103 264 1.008 
Within total  267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Pertaining to the eleventh statement, there was a statistically significant 
difference at p<0.01 on the interpretation that business failure means audit failure. The 
score for the four groups F [3,264]=18.377, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that 
the mean score for auditors and bankers, auditors and investors are significant at the 0.01 
level.  
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Table 4.3.1.12 ANOVA Results on Statement 12 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 9.115 3 3.038 5.132 
 
0.002 
 
Within groups 156.288 264 .592 
Within total  267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On the twelfth statement, there is a statistically significant difference at 
p<0.01 that auditors should be made to pay fine when they do not exercise diligence in 
handling the accounts of a company. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=5.132, 
p=0.002. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for auditors and investors is 
significant at the 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.1.13 ANOVA Results on Statement 13 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 12.014 3 4.005  
6.457 
 
0.000 
Within groups 163.733 264 .620 
Within total 175.746 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Pertaining to the thirteenth statement, there was a statistically significant 
difference at p<0.01 on auditor’s responsibility for maintaining public confidence in a 
company. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=6.457, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc 
test revealed that the mean score for auditors and investors is significant at the 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.1.14 ANOVA Results on Statement 14 
Source SS Df MSS F Significance 
Between groups 6.605 3 2.202  
3.481 
 
0.16 
Within groups 166.963 264 .632 
Within total 173.567 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Finally, the test on the last statement made to reflect the responsibility of 
auditors reveals there was no statistically significant difference at p<0.01 on the auditor’s 
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responsibility to report to shareholders on management efficiency. The score of the four 
groups F [3,264]=3.481, p=0.16. There was no need to carry out a Scheffe’s post-hoc 
test.  
4.3.2 Advanced Data Analysis on the Reliability Factor 
 
Tables 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.5 below presents responses relating to audit reliability. An audit 
expectation gap was found in statement 17 (an unqualified audit report can be relied upon 
to make investment decisions), 19 (auditors are meant to forecast financial profile), 20 
(audited financial statements are useful in monitoring a company’s performance), 21 
(audited financial statements can be used in making decisions pertaining to the sale and 
purchase of shares), 24 (audit reports should contain more information about financial 
forecast), 25 (extent of assurance is clearly indicated in audit reports) and 27 (extent of 
work done is clearly communicated in audit reports). 
 
Table 4.3.2.1 ANOVA Results on Statement 17 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 12.746 3 4.249 5.213 0.002 
Within Groups 215.146 264 .815 
Total 227.892 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 17, there is a statistically significant difference at p<0.01 that 
an unqualified audit report can be relied upon to make investment decisions. The score 
for the four groups F [3,264]=5.213, p=0.002. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the 
mean score for bankers and investors is significant at 0.01 level.  
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Table 4.3.2.2 ANOVA Results on Statement 19 
Source Sum of Squares df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 69.929 3 23.310 32.906 0.000 
Within Groups 187.008 264 .708 
Total 256.937 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Finally, on the reliability factor statement 19 reflects a statistically 
significant difference at p<0.01 that auditors are meant to forecast financial profile. The 
score for the four groups F [3,264]=32.906, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that 
the mean score for auditors and bankers, auditors and investors, auditors and accountants, 
accountants and investors are significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.2.3 ANOVA Results on Statement 20 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 1.246 3 .415 1.074 0.361 
Within Groups 102.168 264 .387 
Total 103.414 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 20 (audited financial statements are useful in monitoring a 
company’s financial performance) there is no statistically significant difference at 
p<0.01. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=1.074, p=0.361.  
Table 4.3.2.4 ANOVA Results on Statement 21 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 3.201 3 1.067 2.526 
 
0.058 
Within Groups 111.545 264 .423 
Total 114.746 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Statement 21 (audited financial statements can be used in making 
decisions pertaining to the sale and purchase of shares) shows there is no statistically 
significant difference at p<0.01. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=2.526, p=0.058. 
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Table 4.3.2.5 ANOVA Results on Statement 24 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 41.164 3 13.721 20.483 0.000 
Within Groups 176.848 264 .670 
Total 218.011 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 24 (audit reports should contain more information on 
financial forecast) there was a statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The score for 
the four groups F [3,264]=20.483, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the 
mean scores for auditors and bankers, auditors and investors, auditors and accountants are 
significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.2.6 ANOVA Results on Statement 25 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups .860 3 .287 .598 0.617 
Within Groups 126.584 264 .479 
Total 127.444 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Regarding statement 25 (the extent of assurance given by an auditor is 
clearly indicated in audit reports), there is no statistically significant difference at p<0.01. 
The score for the four groups F [3,264]=0.598, p=0.617.  
Table 4.3.2.7 ANOVA Results on Statement 27 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 5.427 3 1.809 3.475 0.017 
Within Groups 137.450 264 .521 
Total 142.877 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 27 (the extent of audit work performed should be clearly 
communicated in audit reports), there is no statistically significant difference at p<0.01. 
The score for the four groups F [3,264]=3.475, p=0.017.  
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4.3.3 Advanced Data Analysis on the Nature and Meaning of 
Audit Report Messages Factor 
Table 4.3.3.1 ANOVA Results on Statement 15 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 18.085 3 6.028 6.199 
 
0.000 
Within Groups 256.732 264 .972 
Total 274.817 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
 
Interpretation: Pertaining to statement 15, there is a statistically significant difference at 
p<0.01 that an unqualified audit report means that the financial statement is free from 
fraud. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=6.199, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test 
revealed that the mean score for auditors and investors is significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.3.2 ANOVA Results on Statement 16 
Source Sum of Squares df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 17.234 3 5.745 7.387 0.000 
Within Groups 205.315 264 .778 
Total 222.549 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Statement 16 reflects a statistically significant difference at p<0.01 that an 
unqualified audit report means that the financial statement is free from material 
misstatements. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=7.387, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-
hoc test revealed that the mean score for auditors and bankers, auditors and accountants 
are significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.3.3 ANOVA Results on Statement 18 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 23.719 3 7.906 9.700 0.000 
Within Groups 215.187 264 .815 
Total 238.907 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: With respect to statement 18 there is a statistically significant difference at 
p<0.01 that a company whose audit report is unqualified is financially sound. The score 
for the four groups F [3,264]=9.700, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the 
mean score for auditors and investors, investors and accountants are significant at 0.01 
level.  
Table 4.3.3.4 ANOVA Results on Statement 22 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 22.019 3 7.340 9.841 0.000 
Within Groups 196.888 264 .746 
Total 218.907 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 22 (an unqualified audit report means that a company is a 
safe investment haven) there is a statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The score 
for the four groups F [3,264]=9.841, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the 
mean score for auditors and investors, accountants and investors are significant at 0.01 
level.  
Table 4.3.3.5 ANOVA Results on Statement 23 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 36.973 3 12.324 3.163 0.025 
Within Groups 1028.698 264 3.897 
Total 1965.672 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Pertaining to statement 23 (an unqualified audit report means that a 
company is well managed) there is no statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The 
score for the four groups F [3,264]=3.163, p=0.025.  
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Table 4.3.3.6 ANOVA Results on Statement 26 
Source Sum of Squares df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 17.016 3 5.672 5.979 0.001 
Within Groups 250.461 264 .949 
Total 267.478 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Upon testing statement 26 (an unqualified audit report means that the 
company has kept proper books of accounts and the financial statements are in agreement 
with the books), there was a statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The score for 
the four groups F [3,264]=5.979, p=0.001. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean 
score for auditors and accountants is significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.3.7 ANOVA Results on Statement 28  
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 9.905 3 3.302 4.407 0.005 
Within Groups 197.781 264 .749 
Total 207.687 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 28 (an unqualified audit report shows that the financial 
statements show a true and fair view of the state of affairs of a company) there is a 
statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The score for the four groups F 
[3,264]=4.407, p=0.005. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed no mean score responsible for 
the significant difference at 0.01 level.  
4.3.4 Advanced Data Analysis on the Independence Factor 
Table 4.3.4.1 ANOVA Results on Statement 29 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 4.911 3 1.637 3.442 0.17 
Within Groups 125.551 264 .476 
Total 130.463 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: Table 4.3.4.1 shows that regarding statement 29 (auditor independence can 
influence the performance of audit services) there is no statistically significant difference 
at p<0.01. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=3.442, p=0.17.  
Table 4.3.4.2 ANOVA Results on Statement 30 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 8.869 3 2.956 6.378 0.000 
Within Groups 122.366 264 .464 
Total 131.235 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 30 (when an auditor engages in provision of non-audit and 
audit services at the same time, objectivity may be impaired) there is a statistically 
significant difference at p<0.01. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=6.378, p=0.000. 
Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for auditors and investors is 
significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.4.3 ANOVA Results on Statement 31 
Source Sum of Squares df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 26.819 3 8.940 14.058 0.000 
Within Groups 167.879 264 .636 
Total 194.698 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: Pertaining to statement 31 (provision of audit services consistently for a 
long period of time may lead to familiarity threat) there was no statistically significant 
difference at p<0.01. The score for the four groups F [3,264]=14.058, p=0.000. Scheffe’s 
post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for auditors and bankers, bankers and 
investors, bankers and accountants are significant at 0.01 level.  
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Table 4.3.4.4 ANOVA Results on Statement 32 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 41.949 3 13.983 21.038 0.000 
Within Groups 175.465 264 .665 
Total 217.414 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 32 (auditors are not independent in the Nigerian business 
environment) there is a statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The score for the 
four groups F [3,264]=21.038, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean 
score for auditors and investors, auditors and bankers, auditors and accountants are 
significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.4.5 ANOVA Results on Statement 33 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 59.794 3 19.931 30.660 0.000 
Within Groups 171.620 264 .650 
Total 231.414 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 33 (auditors are more concerned with pleasing management) 
there is a statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The score for the four groups F 
[3,264]=30.660, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for 
auditors and investors, auditors and bankers, auditors and accountants are significant at 
0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.4.6 ANOVA Results on Statement 34 
Source Sum of Squares df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 9.095 3 3.032 5.289 0.001 
Within Groups 151.323 264 .573 
Total 160.418 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Interpretation: On statement 34 (auditors are willing to settle negligence out of court in 
Nigeria) there is a statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The score for the four 
groups F [3,264]=5.289, p=0.001. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for 
auditors and bankers is significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.3.4.7 ANOVA Results on Statement 35 
Source Sum of Squares Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 25.188 3 8.396 16.989 0.000 
Within Groups 130.469 264 .494 
Total 155.657 267  
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Interpretation: On statement 35 (the quality of audit has improved in recent years) there is 
a statistically significant difference at p<0.01. The score for the four groups F 
[3,264]=16.989, p=0.000. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for 
auditors and investors, auditors and bankers, auditors and accountants are significant at 
0.01 level.  
4.3.5 Factor Analysis of the Independent Variables  
The above analysis focused on the difference in opinion of the occupational groups with 
respect to the thirty five (35) statements. Consequently, to know the factors driving the 
differences, Factor Analysis was conducted to reduce the variables to a manageable size 
(Pallant, 2004:151). More correlations of 0.3 and above were found. In assessing the 
factorability of the primary data used in this study, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy in this study is 0.834 which is higher than the suggested value of 0.6 
(Pallant, 2004:153). Also, Barlett’s test of sphericity value is significant (p=0.000 at 0.05 
and 0.01 respectively). This makes Factor Analysis appropriate in this study (Pallant, 
2004:153).  
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To determine the number of factors we need to extract, using Kaiser’s criterion, we are 
concerned in components with an Eigen value of 1 or more. Only the first ten 
components recorded eigenvalues above 1 (6.706, 4.357, 2.382, 1.917, 1.615, 1.285, 
1,120, 1.062, 1.018, 1.008). These ten components explained a total of 64.201% of the 
variance. A look at the screeplot drawn by SPSS version 15 revealed that there was a 
clear break between the second and third components and components 1 and 2 capture 
more of the variance. The component matrix showed the loadings on each of the items on 
the ten components. There are fewer factor loadings on component 6 to 10.  
Varimax rotation was applied and it can be deduced that the audit expectation gap is a 
multifaceted issue. However, the gap is made up of mainly responsibility issues. The first 
two components which have more factor loadings on them were used to explain the audit 
expectation gap. The results are presented in the table below. 
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Table 4.3.5.1 Factor Analysis Grouping of the Components of the Audit 
Expectation Gap in Nigeria 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 
Responsibility for: 
Fraud Detection 
 
0.808 
 
 
Fraud Prevention 0.781  
Effective Internal Control 0.718  
Verify Every Accounting Transaction 0.684  
Prepare Financial Statements 0.741  
Financial Forecast 0.695  
Disclosing Theft 0.583  
Information on Financial Forecast in Audit Reports 0.618  
Business Failure 0.601  
Reliability:  
For Investment Decision 
 
 
 
0.791 
Nature and Meaning of Audit Report Messages: Unqualified Audit 
Report means Company: 
Is Free from Fraud 
  
0.752 
Is a Safe Investment Haven   0.734 
Is Financially Sound  0.728 
Is Free from Material Misstatements  0.723 
Has Kept Proper Books of Accounts  0.679 
Financial Statement shows a True and Fair View of the State of Affairs 
of the Company 
 0.640 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
These two components were extracted because of the factor loadings on each of them 
compared to the other components. It can be deduced from the table that the audit 
expectation gap is a responsibility issue. However, loadings on factor 2 showed that there 
is an audit expectation gap on reliance on audit report for investment decision making 
and on misunderstanding of the nature and meaning of audit report messages. This further 
explains the findings from the test of significance of the difference between groups with 
respect to the thirty five statements carried out earlier in this chapter.  
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4.4 Hypotheses Testing 
In this section, the results of the four hypotheses formulated for the purpose of this study 
are presented. The results are shown in the section below.  
4.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
H0: There is no difference between the opinion of auditors and audit beneficiaries on the 
statutory role of external auditors in Nigeria. 
H1: There is a difference between the opinion of auditors and audit beneficiaries on the 
statutory role of external auditors in Nigeria. 
Test of Hypothesis 1 
Table 4.4.1 Hypothesis 1- Auditor’s Responsibility for Expressing an 
Independent Opinion on the Financial Statements Based on their Audit 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree - - - - - 
Disagree 1 0 0 1 2 
Agree 14 2 18 6 40 
Strongly Agree 36 73 77 40 226 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Decision: The supporting hypothetical test for this table is given in table 4.3.1.2 above. 
At degree of freedom between, within and within total groups of 3, 264 and 267 
respectively and 0.01 level of significance, the F value is 6.046. Consequently, we accept 
the alternative hypothesis and conclude that there was a statistically significant difference 
at the p=0.000 level on auditor’s responsibility for expressing an independent opinion on 
the financial statements score for the four groups. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that 
the mean score for bankers and auditors is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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4.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
H0: There is no difference in reliability scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria. 
H1: There is difference in reliability scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria.  
Test of Hypothesis 2  
Table 4.4.2 Hypothesis 2- An Unqualified Audit Report can be relied 
Upon to Make Investment Decisions 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 9 6 6 8 29 
Disagree 15 11 12 10 48 
Agree 17 41 44 20 122 
Strongly Agree 10 17 33 9 69 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Decision: The supporting hypothetical test for this table is given in table 4.3.2.1. At 
degree of freedom between, within and within total groups of 3, 264 and 267 respectively 
and 0.01 level of significance, the F value is 5.213. Consequently, we accept the 
alternative hypothesis and conclude that there was a statistically significant difference at 
the p=0.002 level that an unqualified audit report can be relied upon to make investment 
decisions for the four groups. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for 
bankers and investors is significant at 0.01 level.  
4.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
H0: There is no difference in nature and meaning of audit report messages scores between 
auditors, bankers, investors and accountants in Nigeria. 
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H1: There is difference in nature and meaning of audit report messages scores between 
auditors, bankers, investors and accountants in Nigeria.  
 Test of Hypothesis 3 
Table 4.4.3.1 Hypothesis 3- An Unqualified Audit Report means that the 
Financial Statement is Free from Fraud 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 7 18 10 12 47 
Disagree 20 29 23 18 90 
Agree 12 19 34 9 74 
Strongly Agree 12 9 28 8 57 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Decision: The supporting hypothetical test for this table is given in table 4.3.3.1. At 
degree of freedom between, within and within total groups of 3, 264 and 267 respectively 
and 0.01 level of significance, the F value is 6.199. Consequently, we accept the 
alternative hypothesis and conclude that there was a statistically significant difference at 
the p=0.000 level that an unqualified audit report means that the financial statement is 
free from fraud for the four groups. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score 
for auditors and investors is significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 4.4.3.2 Hypothesis 3- An Unqualified audit Report means that the 
Financial Statements is Free from Material Misstatements 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 4 4 9 6 23 
Disagree 20 1 13 14 48 
Agree 16 37 46 15 114 
Strongly Agree 11 33 27 12 83 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
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Decision: The supporting hypothetical test for this table is given in table 4.3.3.2. At 
degree of freedom between, within and within total groups of 3, 264 and 267 respectively 
and 0.01 level of significance, the F value is 7.387. Consequently, we accept the 
alternative hypothesis and conclude that there was a statistically significant difference at 
the p=0.000 level that an unqualified audit report means that the financial statement is 
free from material misstatements for the four groups. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that 
the mean score for auditors and bankers, auditors and accountants are significant at 0.01 
level.  
Table 4.4.3.3 Hypothesis 3- An Unqualified Audit Report means a 
Company is a Safe Investment Haven 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 9 11 6 8 34 
Disagree 19 40 25 19 103 
Agree 12 21 38 18 89 
Strongly Agree 11 3 26 2 42 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Decision: The supporting hypothetical test for this table is given in table 4.3.3.4 At 
degree of freedom between, within and within total groups of 3, 264 and 267 respectively 
and 0.01 level of significance, the F value is 9.841. Consequently, we accept the 
alternative hypothesis and conclude that there was a statistically significant difference at 
the p=0.000 level that an unqualified audit report means that the company is a safe 
investment haven for the four groups. Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean 
score for auditors and investors, accountants and investors are significant at 0.01 level.  
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Table 4.4.3.4 Hypothesis 3- An Unqualified Audit Report means that the 
Financial Statement shows a True and Fair View of the State of Affairs 
of a Company 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 3 4 4 6 17 
Disagree 13 4 14 7 38 
Agree 19 26 41 21 107 
Strongly Agree 16 41 36 13 106 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Decision: The supporting hypothetical test for this table is given in table 4.3.3.7. At 
degree of freedom between, within and within total groups of 3, 264 and 267 respectively 
and 0.01 level of significance, the F value is 4.407. Consequently, we accept the 
alternative hypothesis and conclude that there was a statistically significant difference at 
the p=0.005 level that an unqualified audit report means that the financial statements 
show a true and fair view of the state of affairs of a company for the four groups. 
4.4.4 Hypothesis 4 
H0: There is no difference in independence scores between auditors, bankers, investors 
and accountants in Nigeria. 
H1: There is difference in independence scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria. 
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Table 4.4.1 Hypothesis 4- When an Auditor engages in Provision of 
Audit and Non-audit Services at the same time, Objectivity may be 
Impaired 
 Occupation  
Response Bankers Auditors Investors Accountants Total 
Strongly Disagree 2 0 1 1 4 
Disagree 4 2 14 9 29 
Agree 31 31 50 21 133 
Strongly Agree 14 42 30 16 102 
Total 51 75 95 47 268 
Source: Administered Questionnaires by Nwobu (2008) 
Decision: The supporting hypothetical test for this table is given in table 4.3.4.2. At 
degree of freedom between, within and within total groups of 3, 264 and 267 respectively 
and 0.01 level of significance, the F value is 6.378. Consequently, we accept the 
alternative hypothesis and conclude that there was a statistically significant difference at 
the p=0.000 level that an unqualified audit report means that the financial statements 
show a true and fair view of the state of affairs of a company for the four groups. 
Scheffe’s post-hoc test revealed that the mean score for auditors and investors is 
significant at 0.01 level.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0 Introduction 
This section is concerned with the summary of findings, conclusion and 
recommendations. Also, a summary of work done is provided. The theoretical and 
empirical findings are discussed. Finally, suggestions are made for further study. 
5.1 Summary of Work Done 
This study was undertaken to examine the presence of an audit expectation gap in the 
Nigerian investment horizon. The factors this study focuses on are responsibility of 
auditors, reliability on audited financial statements for investment decisions, nature and 
meaning of audit report messages and independence factor. These factors ultimately 
determine the presence or absence of an audit expectation gap in Nigeria.  
The introduction to this study includes a background to the study. Over the years, the 
external auditor has been blamed for the collapse of companies especially after an 
unqualified audit report was issued. There is a belief that they are responsible for such 
events and the society expects them to detect fraud and expose illegal acts in the 
companies they audit. This is parallel to their statutory responsibility. It is also a fact that 
auditors may not be objective enough given the present circumstances in the Nigerian 
environment. This is because some auditors engage in providing audit and non-audit 
services to the same client at a given point in time. To this end, some accounting firms 
have demarcated their departments to ensure that each is like a company on its own. The 
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question still remains as to how long this will continue given the delicate role auditors 
have to play in safeguarding public confidence in the companies. 
The literature review consists of various studies on the audit expectation gap. The results 
from these studies showed that the audit profession in some countries of the world like 
United Kingdom, Bangladesh, India, Singapore, Malaysia, China and South Africa has 
had to respond to public criticism. The literature review consists of a conceptual and 
theoretical framework of the audit expectation gap in Nigeria. The conceptual framework 
focuses on the researcher’s idea of the problem at hand (auditors are criticized by the 
public because they do not carry out their responsibilities, inadequate independence, 
users do not understand the nature and meaning of audit report messages and users may 
not know the extent to which they can rely on the audit report when making investment 
decisions).  
Auditors are guided by the statutes and auditing standards when carrying out their 
responsibilities. Recently, International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 240 was provided to 
guide the auditor in carrying out his or her responsibility relating to fraud in the audit of 
financial statements. This is significantly one of the ways to reduce this expectation gap. 
Presently, audit has moved from what it used to be to risk based. This means the auditor 
identifies the areas of high risk in the business and focuses on them even though other 
areas in the business will be examined.  
The entire population of study is made up of the Nigerian business landscape. However, 
the working population is made up of accountants in business, accountants in practice 
(auditors), investors/stockbrokers and bankers. The accountants in business are persons 
122 
 
employed in companies as accountants. The accountants in practice are persons who have 
their own accounting firms or work with accounting firms. The investors are persons who 
have shares or invest on behalf of other people (stockbrokers). The bankers are persons 
who deal with people who collect loan from the bank. The sample size of this study 
consists of a hundred (100) each of accountants, auditors, investors/stockbrokers and 
bankers/lender employees. The research instrument used was the questionnaire. The 
respondents were assured of confidentiality in a cover letter attached to the questionnaire. 
The data was collected after one week and coded into Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 15. The result of the analysis showed that the first, second, third 
and fourth null hypotheses were rejected and we accepted the alternative hypothesis.  
5.2 Summary of Findings 
In this section, the researcher is concerned about the findings from the literature review 
as well as the findings from the data collected by means of questionnaires.  
5.2.1 Theoretical Findings  
From the review of the literature, the following theoretical findings were deduced: 
1. The audit function is crucial in providing users with assurance about the information 
provided by management in the financial statements. Saha and Baruah (2008:77) revealed 
that users expect this information to be free from management bias and correct, true and 
fair with respect to the enterprise resource.  
2. The audit expectation gap is associated with the independent audit function (Lin and 
Chen, 2004:93). The study of an ‘audit expectation gap’ has been carried out in China 
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(Lin and Chen, 2004), India (Saha and Baruah, 2008), South Africa (Gloeck, 1993), 
Malaysia (Ali, Yusof, Mohamad and Lee, 2004), (Lee, Gloeck and Palaniappan, 2007), 
Singapore (Best, Buckby and Tan, 2001), Bangladesh (Siddiqui and Nasreen, 2004) and 
the United Kingdom (Humphrey, Moizer and Turley, 1993).   
3. Some of the causes of an audit expectation gap may be traced to audit objectives, 
auditor’s obligation to detect and report fraud, auditor independence, and third party 
liability of auditors (Lin and Chen, 2004:93, Lee et al, 2007:5), quality of the profession’s 
performance, its objectives and results and that which society’s expect (Ali et al, 2004:2), 
continued use of short form audit report which has resulted in the misunderstanding of 
users about the auditor’s responsibilities (Best, Buckby and Tan, 2001:2), audit 
responsibility, audit reliability and decision usefulness of audited financial statements 
(Siddiqui and Nasreen, 2004:1) and unreasonable expectations, inadequate performance 
by users about the auditor and audited financial statements (Adeniji, 2004:512), role and 
responsibilities of auditors, quality of the audit function, structure and regulation of the 
profession, nature and meaning of audit report messages and the auditor’s ability to 
communicate different levels of assurance to users (Schelluch and Gay, 2006:654). Also, 
Saha and Baruah (2008:81) asserted that this gap is an outcome of many aspects such as 
the mature of the audit process, the audit function, the constituent boundaries surrounding 
the audit and performance of auditors.  
4. Siddiqui and Nasreen (2004:15) found that the mean scores for auditor’s responsibility 
for soundness of internal control structure of the entity, maintaining accounting records 
and not exercising judgment in the selection of audit procedure were consistent for the 
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two groups (auditors and students). Accounting students responded in a manner similar to 
the audit practitioners and had adopted many of the views of the profession (Siddiqui and 
Nasreen, 2004:8-9). Accounting students did not differ in their opinion from the other 
students on these areas.  
5. Even though auditors are expected to maintain public confidence in companies they 
invest in, Saha and Baruah (2008:74) deduced that users of financial statements do not 
have confidence on the auditors and the auditing process. 
6. Other purposes of an audit are prevention/detection of errors and fraud (Adeleke, 
1996:8). But users generally believe this is the main reason for an audit of financial 
statements. However, Saha and Baruah (2008:73-81) sounded that the largest difference 
(audit expectation gap) related to views about detection/prevention of fraud and errors, 
going concern assumption, the nature of balance sheet valuation, reporting on material 
misstatement, threats to auditor independence, auditor’s ability to cope with 
risks/diagnosing business problems, issues relating to audit committees, auditor’s 
relationship with management, deficient accounting standard, auditor’s responsibility to 
report on management efficiency, soundness of the internal control system and the extent 
of responsibility to third parties. In all these areas, the auditors rejected these 
responsibilities while the users of audited financial statements affirmed them.  
7. The continued use of the short form audit report in Singapore has resulted in a high 
audit expectation gap in the area of auditor responsibilities for fraud detection/prevention 
and preparation of accounts (Best, Buckby and Tan, 2001:2).  
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8. Also, Ekwueme (2000:14) asserted that the audit expectation gap in Nigeria lies 
between the role of an auditor as perceived by the auditor and the expectation of users of 
financial statements. This gap has emerged due to the changing nature of the business 
environment. 
9. Gloeck (1993) in a study of the audit expectation gap in South Africa found that almost 
60% of the knowledgeable respondents were of the opinion that the auditor is strongly 
influenced by the management of the company which he/she audits and 70% of 
stockbrokers were of the same opinion. Conversely, 42% of persons in public practice did 
not support this view.  
5.2.2 Empirical Findings 
The findings of this study have been reached based on the feedback from the respondents. 
It also includes the extent to which the various occupational groups differ significantly in 
interpreting the responsibility of auditors, unqualified audit report messages, reliability on 
the audit report. Some of the findings are in line with the thoughts of previous researchers 
in this area of study while other findings conflict with those of previous researchers. The 
major findings of this study as deduced from the test of hypothesis are: 
1. There is a difference between the opinion of auditors and audit beneficiaries on the 
statutory role of external auditors in Nigeria.   
2.  There is difference in reliability scores between auditors, bankers, investors and 
accountants in Nigeria.  
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3. There is difference in nature and meaning of audit report messages scores (an 
unqualified audit report is free from fraud, free from material misstatements, is a safe 
investment haven and is a true and fair view of the state of affairs of a company) between 
auditors, bankers, investors and accountants in Nigeria.  
4. There is difference in independence scores (objectivity may be impaired when an 
auditor engages in providing non-audit and audit services to the same client at the same 
time) between auditors, bankers, investors and accountants in Nigeria.  
Other findings are: 
1. On the auditor’s responsibility for preparing the financial statements verifying 
every accounting transaction undertaken by a company, detecting all fraud, 
preventing all fraud, ensuring an effective internal control, disclosing theft, 
business failure, pay fine when accounts are not handled diligently, maintaining 
public confidence, reporting management efficiency to shareholders, a lower 
support was shown by auditors (with the lowest mean scores) when compared 
with the mean of bankers, investors and accountants on the above issues. These 
data indicate that auditor respondents showed lower support for these issues.  
2. On the other hand, the mean for responsibility for expressing an independent 
opinion on the financial statements, exercising judgment in selecting audit 
procedures, evaluating and communicating the going concern status is higher for 
auditors than the mean for the other respondent groups on each of the statements. 
This suggests that auditor respondents strongly understand the main objective of 
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statutory audit which is to express an independent opinion on the financial 
statements based on their audit.  
3. Similarly, in this study it was discovered that the mean scores for the auditor’s 
exercise of judgment in selection of audit procedures, taking on additional 
responsibility for evaluating and communicating whether a company is a going 
concern and reporting to shareholders on management efficiency were consistent 
for the four groups of respondents.  
4. An audit expectation gap was found to be wide in the area of auditor’s 
responsibilities with respect to preparation of the company’s financial statements, 
responsibility for verifying every accounting transaction undertaken by a 
company, responsibility for detecting/preventing all fraud in a company, 
responsibility for an effective system of internal control, responsibility for 
disclosing whether any theft occurred during the financial year, liability for 
business failure, being financially liable when the accounts of a company are not 
handled diligently and responsibility for maintaining public confidence in a 
company. These findings authenticate the results from the Factor Analysis. The 
audit expectation gap was found to be a multidimensional issue but consisted 
mainly of responsibility factors. 
5. An audit expectation gap was not found in the area of evaluating and 
communicating the going concern status of a company and reporting to 
shareholders on management efficiency.  
6. In the area of relying on the audited financial statement for investment decision, 
an auditor interviewee claimed that the investor may rely on the audited financial 
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statements but ought to consult professionals before taking action. The findings 
from the questionnaire revealed that the auditor respondents opined that even 
though an unqualified audit report is clean, it cannot be wholly depended on to 
make investment decisions, and audit reports do not communicate the extent of 
work done. However, the result from investor respondents on this factor shows 
that they believe they can rely upon audit reports to make investment decisions.  
7. On the same reliability factor, auditor respondents showed the lowest support for 
forecasting financial profile, usefulness of audited financial statements in 
forecasting financial profile and making decisions pertaining to the sale and 
purchase of shares, audit reports should contain more information about financial 
forecast than the other respondents. This was denoted by the lowest mean scores. 
Also, the mean for investors is highest with respect to forecast of financial profile. 
This expectation may be traced to the blame of auditors for subsequent illiquidity 
of a company after an unqualified (clean) report is given by auditors.  
8. On the nature and meaning of audit report messages factor, the meaning of an 
unqualified audit report was perceived differently by the respondents. A higher 
number of auditors, bankers and accountants disagreed that an unqualified audit 
report means that the financial statement is free from fraud, is financially sound, 
is a safe investment haven, that the company is well managed. The investors 
opined otherwise (agreed) in both cases. The respondents admit that an 
unqualified audit report should be free from material misstatements.  
9. Auditor respondents showed high support that an unqualified audit report is free 
from material misstatements, means that a company has kept proper books and 
129 
 
the financial statements show a true and fair view of the state of affairs of a 
company. This suggests that the auditor respondents understand the meaning of 
this kind of audit report.  
10. The four groups of respondents perceived that auditor independence can influence 
the performance of audit services. They were also supportive that an auditor who 
engages in the provision of non-audit and audit services at the same time may not 
be objective. Interestingly, a higher number of auditors opined that provision of 
audit services consistently for a long period of time will not lead to familiarity 
threat even though the other respondent groups agreed to it. The financial 
statement (accountants) showed the highest support for the statement that 
provision of audit services for a long period of time may lead to familiarity threat. 
11. Many respondents other than the auditors agreed that auditors are more concerned 
with pleasing management. More investors and accountants disagreed that the 
quality of audit has improved in the recent years. The lowest support was shown 
by auditors pertaining to their not being independent, concerned with pleasing 
management and willing to settle negligence out of court. The preparers showed 
the lowest support that the quality of audit has improved in the recent years.  
5.3 Conclusion 
 
This research illustrates that even though auditors are responsible for maintaining public 
confidence in a company; there are certain expectations that the society has about the 
audit function that are unreasonable. These contribute to an audit expectation gap. The 
results of this study demonstrate a substantial knowledge of auditing by the other three 
groups of respondents with respect to fraud detection/prevention by auditors, verifying 
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every transaction and liability for business failure. Most respondents were that the auditor 
should take on additional responsibility for communicating and evaluating the going 
concern status of a company. However, this study found that there is an audit expectation 
gap with respect to the statutory audit objective, nature and meaning of audit report 
messages, reliability and independence factors.  
The different perceptions among the user respondents and auditors could be attributed to 
the inadequate education of users of the auditor’s responsibilities. However, the call for 
other responsibilities by users may be a means to deviate from the traditional audit 
objective and move to risk based auditing. The presence of an ‘expectation gap’ in 
auditing means that perhaps, as put forward by other researchers, more standards should 
be made to enhance the performance of auditors. Also, some previous researchers have 
concluded that it is expedient for the audit profession to respond to public criticism by 
improving the quality of work done by auditors. The analysis of the audit expectation gap 
in this study will help the accounting profession to bridge the gap. 
5.4 Recommendations 
The following recommendations have been drawn from the findings: 
1. Since there is an audit expectation gap in the area of preparation of the company’s 
financial statements, responsibility for verifying every accounting transaction 
undertaken by a company, responsibility for detecting/preventing all fraud in a 
company, responsibility for an effective system of internal control, responsibility 
for disclosing whether any theft occurred during the financial year, liability for 
business failure, being financially liable when the accounts of a company are not 
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handled diligently and responsibility for maintaining public confidence in a 
company, users should be educated on the responsibilities of auditors and nature 
of audit services. 
2. The accounting profession should seek to reduce the number of years an auditor 
can provide auditing services to a client. This is because the independence of an 
auditor is threatened when engaged in providing audit services for a long time.  
3. Users of audited financial statements are encouraged to seek professional advice 
before investing in a company. This will further assure them of the safety of their 
investment than merely interpreting that an unqualified audit report is a clean bill 
of health of the company. 
4. Perhaps, the accounting profession should consider using the long-form audit 
report which will explain further the meaning of the report and the extent to which 
it can be relied upon because some users may not understand the profession’s 
language with respect to ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’.  
5. Audit firms should be discouraged from providing audit and non-audit services to 
the same client. This will increase the independence of the auditor when carrying 
out audit assignments.  
6. Auditors are encouraged to exercise due care and diligence in handling the 
accounts of a company. This is because failure to do so may abruptly end the 
business and increase the blame on the accounting profession.  
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
5.5 Suggestions for Further Study 
Not all the factors contributing to an audit expectation gap have been examined in this 
study. Other factors which may be looked into in future research are the influence of the 
audit report on educating users of financial statements, environmental factors in the 
Nigerian business environment that may lead to an audit expectation gap and reducing 
the responsibility of auditor issues associated with the audit expectation gap in Nigeria.  
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                    Department of Accounting 
                              College of Business and Social Sciences 
                   Covenant University 
                   Canaanland 
                   Ogun State. 
                         15-10-2008. 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 This questionnaire is designed to find out ‘The Factors contributing to an Audit Expectation Gap in 
Nigeria’. This project is undertaken in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of an M Sc. Degree in 
the above department.  
Please kindly complete this questionnaire as honestly as you can. All information supplied will be used solely for the 
purpose of this study and will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Your co-operation will be highly appreciated. 
Thank you in advance.  
                     Yours faithfully, 
                          ………………. 
                     Nwobu Obiamaka 
                     (CU021010093) 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION A- PERSONAL BIODATA 
1. Name of Organization………………………………………………. 
2. Highest Academic Qualification: WAEC    OND    HND     B Sc.    BA     MBA     M Sc.     PhD  
3. Professional Qualification  
4. Do you have auditing experience?  
5. If yes, for how long: Below 1 year       1-10 years      above 10 years 
6. Occupation: Lender Employee      Auditor     Investor     Accountant   
 
 
 
ANANACCAACA 
Yes No
CPA
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Instruction: The following statements use a four (4) point likert scale. On the scale, four (4) is the highest 
construct. The likert scale is given as follows: 4-strongly agree, 3- agree, 2- disagree, and 1- strongly disagree.  
SECTION B- RESPONSIBILITY FACTOR SA A D SD 
1 
Auditors are responsible for the preparation of the company's 
financial statements.  4 3 2 1 
2 
The auditor is responsible for expressing an independent 
opinion on the financial statements based on their audit.  4 3 2 1 
3 
The auditor is responsible for verifying every accounting 
transaction undertaken by a company.  4 3 2 1 
4 
The auditor is responsible for detecting all fraud in a 
company. 4 3 2 1 
5 
The auditor is responsible for preventing all fraud in a 
company.  4 3 2 1 
6 
The auditor is responsible for an effective internal control in a 
company. 4 3 2 1 
7 
The auditor exercises judgment in selection of audit 
procedures  4 3 2 1 
8 
The auditor should take on additional responsibility for 
evaluating whether a company is a going concern. 4 3 2 1 
9 
The auditor should take on additional responsibility for 
communicating whether a company is a going concern. 4 3 2 1 
10 
The auditor is responsible for disclosing whether any theft 
occurred during the financial year.  4 3 2 1 
11 Business failure means audit failure 4 3 2 1 
12 
Auditors should be made to pay a fine when they do not 
exercise diligence in handling the accounts of a company 4 3 2 1 
13 
An auditor is responsible for maintaining public confidence in 
a company 4 3 2 1 
14 
An auditor should report to shareholders on management 
efficiency 4 3 2 1 
SECTION C- RELIABILITY FACTOR 
15 
An unqualified audit report means that the financial statement 
is free from fraud. 4 3 2 1 
16 
An unqualified audit report means that the financial statement 
is free from material misstatements. 4 3 2 1 
17 
An unqualified audit report can be relied upon to make 
investment decisions 4 3 2 1 
18 
A company whose audit report is unqualified is financially 
sound  4 3 2 1 
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19 Auditors are meant to forecast financial profile 4 3 2 1 
20 
The audited financial statements are useful in monitoring a 
company's performance. 4 3 2 1 
21 
The audited financial statements can be used in making 
decisions pertaining to sale and purchase of shares 4 3 2 1 
22 
An unqualified audit report means that a company is a safe 
investment haven 4 3 2 1 
23 
An unqualified audit report means that a company is well 
managed  4 3 2 1 
24 
Audit reports should contain more information about financial 
forecast  4 3 2 1 
25 
The extent of assurance given by an auditor is clearly 
indicated in audit reports.   4 3 2 1 
26 
An unqualified audit report means that the company is free 
from fraud. 4 3 2 1 
27 The extent of audit work performed is clearly communicated 4 3 2 1 
28 
An unqualified audit report shows that the financial 
statements show a true and fair view. 4 3 2 1 
SECTION E- INDEPENDENCE FACTOR 
29 
Auditor independence can influence the performance of audit 
services. 4 3 2 1 
30 
When an auditor engages in provision of non-audit and audit 
services at the same time, objectivity may be impaired. 4 3 2 1 
31 
Provision of audit services consistently for a long period of 
time may lead to familiarity threat.  4 3 2 1 
32 
Auditors are not independent in the Nigerian business 
environment 4 3 2 1 
33 Auditors are more concerned with pleasing management 4 3 2 1 
34 
Auditors are willing to settle negligence out of court in 
Nigeria 4 3 2 1 
     35    The quality of audit has improved in the recent years                       4    3     2   1 
 
 
